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I. INTRODUCTION
In most divorces today, the largest asset held by the divorcing
couple is a retirement fund belonging to one of the spouses.1 Courts in
1. Mark S. Maddox & Margaret K. Cassidy, Division of Employee Benefits Upon Divorce:
An Analysis of the Retirement Equity Act of 1984 and a Framework of Distribution of Benefits, 58
OHIO BAR 436, 436 (1985) (stating that in most divorces, “the pension rights or employee benefits
of one or both spouses are the most significant marital assets owned by the couple. Accordingly,
employee benefits are increasingly subject to division in state divorce proceedings.”). See also
Jessica Straub, Note, Erb v. Erb: A Step Toward Clarification in Public Pension Division, 33 U.
TOL. L. REV. 915, 916 (2002) (stating that pensions earned during marriage are usually marital
property and are crucial in divorce because the pension is often the largest marital asset, along with
the marital home); Hilary Greer Fike, Qualified Pension Trends and Divorce Considerations, 14
AM. J. FAM. L. 234, 234-35 (2000) (stating that pensions provide the largest block of private capital
in the country and the Federal Reserve estimated that twenty five percent of financial assets in the
United States were held in pensions, and that the average American couple has a pension worth as
much as their home); David L. Baumer & J.C. Poindexter, Women and Divorce: The Perils of
Pension Division, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 203, 203-04 (1996) (stating that for most couples, the most
valuable assets they own are the family home and their pension plan or plans); Dylan A. Wilde,
Student Article, Obtaining an Equitable Distribution of Retirement Plans in a Divorce Proceeding,
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every state must decide how to divide a married couple’s property in
order to provide each spouse his or her proper share.2 But when there
are no assets large enough to offset the value of the retirement pension,
divorce courts must find a way to “equitably distribute” the proceeds of
the plan.3 Dealing with this large asset presented problems in the past4
as Congress sought to limit the ability to assign proceeds of retirement
plans to anyone who was not the named beneficiary.5
In 1974, Congress passed the Employees Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA)6 in an attempt to protect the employee’s right to
49 S.D. L. REV. 141, 141 (2003) (stating that a U.S. Department of Labor study from 1998 indicated
over ninety-nine million participants of private retirement plans with assets totaling over fourtrillion dollars).
2. Cheyañna L. Jaffke, Death, Taxes, and Now Divorce – The Dyad Expands to a Triad:
ERISA’s Social Policy Harms Women’s Rights, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 255, 268-69 (2001) (describing
the two main ways that states divide property in divorce, one under the community property system,
in which nine states treat all property obtained during the marriage as community property that is
equally divided upon divorce and the other under the common law property system, in which
marital property is merely equitably divided amongst spouses upon divorce, yet the question of what
is marital property differs by state). See also David S. Rosettenstein, The ALI Proposals and the
Distribution of Stock Options and Restricted Stock on Divorce: The Risks of Theory Meet the
Theory of Risk, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 243, 245-46 (2002) (stating that the ALI concluded
that most jurisdictions adopt the principle of equitable distribution of property at divorce, yet there
were different methods of deciding which assets are subject to distribution). Further, the author
states that every state must decide what assets to distribute as marital property in a divorce. Id.;
Baumer & Poindexter, supra note 1, at 207 tbl.1 (classifying states by their respective property
distribution methods, showing that thirty-one states used some form of equitable distribution, while
nine states used a form of community property and ten used only alimony as of 1996).
3. Timothy C. Voit & James L. Parris, Fundamentals of Qualified Domestic Relations
Orders, 12 S.C. LAW. 24, 24 (2001) (stating that a court order to distribute the present value of a
pension is needed when “the lump-sum present value of the pension is too large to adequately offset
the value of the pension against other assets of the marriage or when the parties to the divorce
cannot agree on the present value of the pension in question.”).
4. Maddox & Cassidy, supra note 1, at 436-37 (stating that after Congress passed the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), but before the passing of the
Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (REA), state courts were unsure of what authority they had to divide
pensions in favor of non-employee spouses upon divorce). Plan administrators feared the plan
would lose its tax exempt status if divided. Id. Some courts continued to divide pensions, although
ERISA seemed to preempt any state law authorizing such division under § 514(a). Id. See also
Julie Anne Barbo, Note, Ablamis v. Roper: Preemption of the Nonemployee Spouse’s Community
Property Rights in ERISA Pension Plans, 49 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1085, 1086-87 (1992) (stating
that before ERISA was passed, the lack of pension regulation resulted in a lack of uniformity among
the state laws and unstable financial plans). After ERISA was enacted, courts were split on whether
ERISA’s ban on assigning pension plan benefits applied to divorce decrees that gave rights to a
pension to a non-employee spouse. Id. at 1087.
5. 29 U.S.C.S. § 1056(d)(1) (Lexis 2007) (“Each pension plan shall provide that benefits
provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated.”).
6. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829. See also 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 1001-1461 (Lexis 2007); Keron A. Wright, “Stuck on You”: The
Inability of an Ex-Spouse to Waive Rights Under an ERISA Pension Plan [McGowan v. NJR Serv.
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keep his or her pension.7 Congress protected the pension funds of
employees by eliminating the ability to assign a vested pension, thereby
excluding pensions from possible creditor claims.8 The unfortunate side
effect of ERISA was the difficulty that divorce courts faced in dividing
retirement pensions between ex-spouses in order to achieve an equitable
property division.9 Congress cured this deficiency with the Retirement
Equity Act of 1984 (REA).10 The REA carved out a specific exception
to allow the assignment of pensions in matters of divorce.11 In order to

Corp., 423 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2005)], 45 WASHBURN L.J. 687, 690 (2006) (stating that President
Gerald Ford signed ERISA into law on Labor Day, 1974).
7. 29 U.S.C.S. § 1001(a) (Lexis 2007) (“[I]t is desirable in the interests of employees and
their beneficiaries . . . that disclosure be made and safeguards be provided with respect to the
establishment, operation, and administration of [employee benefit plans].”). See also T. Leigh
Anenson & Dr. Karen Eilers Lahey, The Crisis in Corporate America: Private Pension Liability
and Proposals For Reform, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 495, 495 (2007) (“On September 2, 1974,
Congress enacted the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) to preserve and
protect the pension plans of millions of American workers.”); Jaffke, supra note 2, at 260
(describing how the shut down of the Studebaker plant in 1963, which led to over 2,900 workers
losing all their pension rights, led to Congress regulating the field of retirement pensions).
8. Leslie A. Kulick, What Are the Limitations On QDROS?, 61 J. MO. B. 89, 89 (2005)
(stating that Congress required anti-alienation clauses in all ERISA-qualified plans so that the plans
would be largely non-attachable by creditors). See also Fox Valley & Vicinity Constr. Workers
Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275, 278 (7th Cir. 1990) (“ERISA provides that a pension plan
must prohibit the alienation or assignment of benefits. These ‘spendthrift’ provisions are designed
to prevent unwise alienation or assignment.”) (internal citations omitted); Margaret R. Cooper, A
Family Practitioner’s Guide To Overcoming QDRO Phobia, 8 DEL. L. REV. 213, 214 (2006)
(“[The] purpose of ERISA is to protect pension benefits and protect employees by barring pension
benefits from being used to satisfy judgments.”).
9. Cooper, supra note 8, at 214, stating:
Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s the anti-assignment clause conflicted with
evolving state law that recognized pension rights as marital property subject to division
as a part of a divorce. Congress resolved this dilemma in 1984 when it amended ERISA
by passing the Retirement Equity Act (REA). REA provided for certain exceptions to
the anti-assignment clause of ERISA, allowing assignment of pension benefits pursuant
to court orders that meet the statutory requirements of a qualified domestic relations
order.
Id. See also Maddox & Cassidy, supra note 1, at 437-40 (describing the hurdles a court had to work
through in order to divide a pension in a divorce proceeding under state law without running afoul
of ERISA and the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution).
10. Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (REA), Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426. See also
Cooper, supra note 8, at 214; Maddox & Cassidy, supra note 1, at 440 (“The [REA] was enacted in
part to clarify the scope of ERISA’s spendthrift and preemption provisions insofar as they pertain to
state court orders dividing a participant’s interest in an ERISA-qualified plan.”).
11. 29 U.S.C.S. § 1056(d) (Lexis 2007), providing:
(1) Each pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be
assigned or alienated.
...
(3)(A) Paragraph (1) shall apply to the creation, assignment, or recognition of a right to
any benefit payable with respect to a participant pursuant to a domestic relations order,
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divide a pension, the parties and the court must file a Qualified Domestic
Relations Order (QDRO).12 However, in order to become “qualified,”
the pension plan administrator must approve the Domestic Relations
Order (DRO).13
The process of drafting a QDRO can be time-consuming and
costly.14 The QDRO must conform to ERISA and the pension plan’s
specifications and guidelines.15 A pension plan administrator may have
a specific format or form for QDROs that parties submit for his
approval.16 This boilerplate form may not be advantageous to the non-

except that paragraph (1) shall not apply if the order is determined to be a qualified
domestic relations order. Each pension plan shall provide for the payment of benefits in
accordance with the applicable requirements of any qualified domestic relations order.
Id.
12. Aaron Klein, Note, Divorce, Death, And Posthumous QDROs: When Is It Too Late For A
Divorcee To Claim Pension Benefits Under ERISA?, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1651, 1653-54 (2005)
(stating that in order for a former spouse to receive benefits from a ex-spouse’s retirement plan, the
non-employee spouse must first obtain a domestic relations order (DRO) and then transform the
DRO into a QDRO).
13. Voit & Parris, supra note 3, at 26 (“[A] court order to divide retirement benefits is not a
QDRO until it is qualified or approved by the plan or the plan administrator. It is not qualified by
the court.”). See also Klein, supra note 12, at 1654 (stating that the any domestic relations order
(DRO) must meet “stringent formalistic and substantive requirements before the pension plan may
deem it ‘qualified.’”); Cooper, supra note 8, at 223 (explaining that a judge must sign the order for
it to become a DRO).
14. Klein, supra note 12, at 1654, 1655 (stating that the process of drafting and gaining
approval of a QDRO is long and complex and that sometimes a participant in a pension plan will
actually die before a QDRO is issued). Klein states: “nowhere does ERISA state that a former
spouse must obtain a QDRO before the plan participant’s death. ERISA does not contain an express
provision mandating a former spouse obtain a QDRO as of a certain date.” Id. See also Gary
Shulman, QDROs -- The Ticking Time Bomb, 23 FAM. ADV. 26, 26 (2001) (“Most family law
attorneys are aware of the potential adverse consequences of a participant’s dying before the QDRO
is drafted.”); Friesen v. Friesen, No. 07-AP-110, 2008 WL 603191, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008)
(stating that the parties in that particular case took six years to draft and file a QDRO).
15. Klein, supra note 12, at 1663-64 (stating the QDRO must satisfy “exacting procedural
requirements” of ERISA). Once a spouse receives benefits pursuant to a divorce decree, the exspouse must have the DRO “qualified” by the pension plan administrator who has the right to reject
the DRO as unqualified. Id. See generally Voit & Parris, supra note 3 (describing the differences
between defined benefit and defined contribution plans and how a QDRO must be drafted so that it
can be carried out under the plan specifications). See also Cooper, supra note 8, at 215-16
(describing the requirements of the QDRO set forth in ERISA as well as limitations which the
QDRO may not specify).
16. Cooper, supra note 8, at 222, stating that:
Most Plans provide a sample QDRO that may be set up as a fill-in-the-blank form.
These forms can be dangerous if the blanks are simply filled in with little or no regard to
the language of the stipulated order. Samples are designed to simplify the approval
process for the Plan Administrator and do not safeguard important rights and negotiated
terms.
Id.
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employee spouse, thus requiring modification.17 The process of drafting,
modifying, and obtaining final approval from a pension plan
administrator can take considerable time,18 drawing out the divorce
proceedings and further inconveniencing the parties involved.19 This
time delay also has an impact on the rights of the ex-spouse concerning
other areas of the divorce decree besides the right to a pension.20

17. Id. See also QDROs: the Division of Pensions through Qualified Domestic Relations
Order, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR AND WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN. at Q 3-1 (1997), available at
http://library.findlaw.com/1999/Mar/8/130758.pdf [hereinafter Division of Pensions] (stating that
“[t]here is no single ‘best’ way to divide pension benefits in a QDRO” and that the specific facts of
the case will determine the best way to divide a pension).
18. Klein, supra note 12, at 1655, 1666-67 (stating that participants in pension plans can die
before a QDRO is drafted and that the process of “obtaining a QDRO can be extensive and timeconsuming.”). See also Jaffke, supra note 2, at 298 (recognizing that there are costs and time delays
in processing QDROs in divorce cases); Shulman, supra note 14, at 26 (indicating that participants
in a pension plan at times have died before a QDRO is drafted); Division of Pensions, supra note
17, at Q 2-10 (stating that there is no time limit in which a Plan Administrator must determine
whether a DRO is a QDRO, but that the determination must be within a reasonable time, depending
on the circumstances); 29 U.S.C.S. § 1056(d)(3)(G)(i)(II) (Lexis 2007).
19. Derrit v. Derrit, 836 N.E.2d 39, 43 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (stating that it would be
impractical to withhold hearing an appeal due to the lack of a QDRO because the parties should not
have to wait on actions of non-parties to draft a proper QDRO before litigating their disputed
issues). See also Division of Pensions, supra note 17, at Q 2-4, Q 2-10 (stating that there is no
specified time limit on how long a Pension Plan Administrator can take to decide whether a DRO is
a QDRO, but only that the time must be reasonable). ERISA provides that a Pension Plan
Administrator must preserve separate accounts for each party subject to the DRO for up to 18
months after payments are due under the pension plan while the DRO is in dispute. Id. at Q 2-11.
See also 29 U.S.C.S. § 1056(d)(3)(H)(iii)(II) (Lexis 2007) (providing provisions for how the
Pension Plan Administrator should handle pension plan proceeds when the QDRO is disputed for
longer than eighteen months after the time in which pension plan payments are to start under the
plan).
20. Cody v. Riecker, 594 F.2d 314, 315 (2d Cir. 1979) (stating that a state court can split up
an employee’s pension in order to pay court-ordered support obligations and not run afoul of
ERISA); Lyddy v. Lyddy, No. L-89-245, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 4519, at *6-7 (Ohio Ct. App.
1990) (allowing a QDRO to use pension benefits to pay alimony obligations ordered by the court);
Levine v. Levine, Case No. 96CA17, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 4312, at *13-14 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997)
(following a previously superseded case, Holcomb v. Holcomb, 542 N.E.2d 597, 601 (Ohio 1989),
for the proposition that a spouse’s pension is marital property that does not have to be divided up
equally, but can be used after other property has been distributed in order to help sustain the other
spouse for a specified amount of time). Holcomb was superseded by OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
3105.171 & 3105.18 (2007), which eliminated the concept of alimony in Ohio by dividing it into its
component parts, as stated in Barber v. Barber, Case No. 1804, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 4056, at *8
(Ohio Ct. App. 1992); Moser v. Moser, C.A. No. 94CA005959, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 2036, at *7
(Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (providing, “[t]o qualify as a QDRO, an order must relate to the provision of
child support, alimony payments or marital property rights . . . , and it must be made pursuant to
state domestic relations law.” (quoting Albertson v. Ryder, 621 N.E.2d 480 (Ohio Ct. App.1993))).
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A QDRO is part of the property settlement in a divorce decree.21 In
order to appeal a divorce decree, it must be a final appealable order.22 A
divorce decree is not a final appealable order unless all ancillary issues
to the divorce are determined, including the property division.23 An
issue arises when a pension plan administrator has not yet approved a
QDRO and the parties wish to appeal a decision by the divorce court.24
Important issues such as child custody, child support, alimony, or rights
to personal property may be in dispute.25 These rights granted by the

21. Bohnlein v. Bohnlein, 463 N.E.2d 666, 667 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1983) (ruling for the first
time in Ohio on the issue of whether a pension is marital property). “[I]n a divorce action, an
employee-spouse’s contractual rights to a pension or profit-sharing plan constitute marital property
which should be divided between the spouses.” Id. Baker v. Baker, Case No. 13-95-36, 1996 Ohio
App. LEXIS 307, at *7-9 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (“Subject to the trial court’s discretion, pension
benefits are to be considered in the marital property division, and divided equitably.”); Schrader v.
Schrader, No. L-03-1171, 2005 WL 195487, at *6 (Ohio. Ct. App. 2005) (“It is well-settled that
pension and retirement benefits earned during the course of the marriage are marital assets subject
to division upon a divorce.”); Hoyt v. Hoyt, 559 N.E.2d 1292, 1294-95 (Ohio 1990) (“The general
rule is that pension or retirement benefits earned during the course of a marriage are marital assets
and a factor to be considered not only in the division of property, but also in relationship to an
award of alimony.”).
22. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2505.02(B) (2008) (providing seven methods in which an order
can become a final appealable order that can be “reviewed, affirmed, modified, or reversed, with or
without retrial”). See also Atkinson v. Atkinson, 856 N.E.2d 1023, 1025 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006)
(stating that a final appealable order “is one that affects a substantial right and, in effect, determines
the action, or . . . an order that affects a substantial right made in a special proceeding.”). The court
found that the trial court’s judgment was not a final appealable order because the order did not fully
determine the divorce because there was not a child support order entered by the court. Id. at 1026.
23. OHIO CIV. R. 75(F) (2007). See also infra note 147 and accompanying text.
24. Musci v. Musci, No. 23088, 2006 WL 3208558, at *1-2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) (stating that
parties had previously been before the court to litigate child support issues, but were denied an
appeal because the court-ordered QDRO had not been entered. The parties had to go back and have
the trial court enter an order that a QDRO was not necessary and have that portion of the divorce
decree vacated before the appellate court would hear the appeal.). See also Batt v. Batt, Nos. 82740
& 83452, 2004 WL 717373, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004); (dismissing an appeal in which the trial
court ordered two QDROs to be entered and only one had been filed). In Batt, the wife wished to
appeal the QDRO that the court filed because she claimed it did not reflect the parties’ agreement.
Id. The appellate court would not hear the case due to a lack of jurisdiction because the second
QDRO had not yet been entered. Id. at *1-2.
25. In re James, 866 N.E.2d 467, 468-69 (Ohio 2007) (appealing a child custody decision);
Justice v. Justice, No. CA2006-11-134, 2007 WL 2821794, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (appealing a
child support order); Abbott v. Abbott, No. F-06-020, 2007 WL 2874282, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App.
2007) (appealing a divorce decree based on determinations of child support, child custody, property
settlement, and spousal support); Handy v. Handy, No.2006AP110064, 2007 WL 2429735, at *1-2
(Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (appealing a divorce decree due to the division of marital assets, a distributive
award made to one spouse, and the trial court’s failure to reserve jurisdiction to modify spousal
support); Kassicieh v. Mascotti, Nos. 05AP-684 & 06AP-1224, 2007 WL 2800374, at *1 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2007) (appealing the trial court’s allocation of guardian’s fees between the ex-spouses, child
support obligation, child support overpayment by one spouse, and the court’s finding that exhusband’s debt to the ex-wife was non-dischargeable in bankruptcy). See also Laura Beresh Taylor,
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trial court in a divorce decree may become irreversible as time passes
and an ex-spouse uses or sells personal property, places a child in a new
home or school, or makes alimony and child support payments.26 If
parties must wait for approval of a QDRO, the right to appeal may be of
little use. In the past, a minority of Ohio courts chose to resolve this
inequity by allowing parties to appeal a divorce decree before a pension
plan administrator approved the QDRO, provided the divorce decree met
certain requirements.27 A majority of Ohio courts, however, required
approval of the QDRO before a divorce decree became final and
appealable.28 This spilt in authority prompted the Ohio Supreme Court

Note, C.R.B. v. C.C. and B.C.: Protecting Children’s Need for Stability in Custody Modification
Disputes Between Biological Parents and Third Parties, 32 AKRON L. REV. 371, 371 (1999) (“More
than one million American children are affected by their parents’ divorce each year, and custody
decisions are ‘among the most difficult decisions judges must make today.’”).
26. Robert E. Emery, David Sbarra & Tara Grover, Divorce Mediation: Research and
Reflections, 43 FAM. CT. REV. 22, 30 (2005) (stating that “contact between divorced fathers and
their children is infrequent” and decreases as time passes). The authors believe this is a product of
how adults manage the grief and pain of divorce, by turning away from the ex-spouses and, as a
result, end up divorcing the marital children as well. Id.; John H. Grych, Interparental Conflict as a
Risk Factor for Child Maladjustment: Implications for the Development of Prevention Programs, 43
FAM. CT. REV. 97, 99 (2005) (stating that as time passes, ex-spouses become less contentious and
start to lead increasingly separate lives). See also Sarah L. Gottfried, Note, Virtual Visitation: The
New Wave of Communication Between Children and Non-Custodial Parents In Relocation Cases, 9
CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 567, 567 (2003) (stating that mothers are the heads of households for
ninety percent of children of divorce and seventy-five percent of them relocate at least one time
within four years after the divorce); See generally Merle H. Weiner, Inertia and Inequality:
Reconceptualizing Disputes Over Parental Relocation, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1747 (2007)
(describing the problem of one spouse relocating and how the courts have dealt with the child
custody issues involved in such moving).
27. Derrit v. Derrit, 836 N.E.2d 39, 43 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (allowing an appeal to go
forward despite the fact that a QDRO had not been filed “so long as [the trial court] had directed in
its judgment entry and finding of facts how the pension/retirement assets are to be divided”).
28. Forman v. Forman, No. 9-06-63, 2007 WL 2757630, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007)
(dismissing due to the lack of an appealable order because a Division of Property Order, the Ohio
equivalent of a QDRO, had not been filed); Musci, 2006 WL 3208558 at *2 (previously denying an
appeal because a QDRO was not filed); Cooper v. Cooper, No. 84652, 2005 WL 376608, at *1
(Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (dismissing appeal for lack of a QDRO); Green v. Green, No.04AP-61, 2005
WL 468234, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (dismissing an appeal because the trial court had not yet
entered a QDRO or DOPO); Stare v. Stare, No. 03 CA 109, 2004 WL 2004152, at *2 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2004) (stating that a “clear majority of Ohio appellate courts have consistently held that
divorce orders are not final and appealable if a QDRO has been ordered but not prepared”). The
court declined to follow a case in which an appeal was granted despite the fact that a QDRO had not
been filed. Id. at *3; Batt, 2004 WL 717373, at *1 (stating that a judgment dividing pension rights
between spouses is not appealable until a QDRO has been entered); Procuniar v. Procuniar, C.A.
Case No. 95-CA-19, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 3929, at *5-6 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (rejecting an
argument that an appeal was not timely because it was not filed until the QDRO was filed). The
Procuniar court stated that there was no substantial right affected until the QDRO was filed. Id. at
* 6.
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to grant review of Wilson v. Wilson29 in December of 2006. In
November of 2007, the Court held that divorce decrees are appealable
before the parties file a QDRO.30
This Comment focuses on when a divorce decree should become a
final appealable order if the decree requires the filing of a QDRO. Part I
describes the evolution of the law surrounding pensions. It sets forth the
relevant sections of ERISA and REA, and how the courts have applied
these laws. Part I contains a brief description of the kinds of pensions
that a QDRO does and does not cover. Part II analyzes the issue of
appealable orders and the Ohio Appellate Courts’ split on the issue of
when a divorce decree that requires a QDRO becomes appealable. Part
III reviews the Wilson v. Wilson decision and its effects. Part IV is a
critique of the Ohio Supreme Court decision in Wilson v. Wilson. By
allowing couples to appeal a divorce decree before a QDRO filing, the
Ohio Supreme Court correctly resolved an important issue in Ohio
family law with the Wilson decision. There remains an issue, however,
of proper procedure in dealing with an appeal from the QDRO itself, as
well as the impact of Wilson on other areas of law.
II. BACKGROUND
Pension plans became popular after World War II when labor
unions began actively bargaining for retirement plans in collective
bargaining agreements.31 The United Auto Workers union (UAW) and
the United Steelworkers unions pioneered efforts to establish retirement
plans to provide financial security for aging workers and more job
opportunities for young laborers.32 But many of these plans met with

29. Wilson v. Wilson, No. 05CA0078, 2006 WL 2336871, at *1-2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006)
(dismissing an appeal on August 14, 2006, from the parties’ divorce decree due to the fact that a
QDRO had not yet been filed with the court; therefore the divorce decree was not a final appealable
order and the Appellate Court lacked jurisdiction), review granted, Wilson v. Wilson, 859 N.E.2d
557 (Ohio 2006) (Table) (noting the Ohio Supreme Court granted review of the appellate decision
on December 27, 2006).
30. Wilson v. Wilson, 878 N.E.2d 16, 18 (Ohio 2007).
31. James A. Wooten, “The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business”: The
Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 683, 686-87 (2001)
(recounting the events in the automobile industry and steel industry during the late 1940s that
increased need for pension plans and caused union officials to bargain for pension plans that
covered more employees than just the top management).
32. Id. at 686-89. Unions associated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO)
began bargaining for retirement plans in their collective bargaining agreements in the late 1940s.
Id. at 686-87. The UAW and the Steelworkers unions followed suit. Id. at 687. The desire for the
pension plans came from the aging workforce that was encouraged to stay on the job during World
War II and then could not retire on Social Security, which had diminished in value due to wartime
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financial disaster as the costs of keeping the plans alive were too high
for failing businesses.33 This caused Congress to start regulating pension
plans34 and how employers funded them.35
A. Evolution of the Law
Congress passed ERISA in 1974.36 Before Congress enacted
ERISA, it was common for employers to pay out retirement benefits to
an employee only if the employee kept his job until retirement age.37
inflation. Id. Unions used pensions as a way of inducing older workers to retire and create job
opportunities for younger workers in a more mechanized and productive industry. Wooten, supra
note 31, at 689. See also Anenson & Lahey, supra note 7, at 498 (stating that pension plans allow
employers to “systematically replenish” the workforce by encouraging older, less productive
workers to retire and allow younger workers to be promoted).
33. Wooten, supra note 31, at 692-97, 730. In the years immediately after World War II,
small independent automobile manufacturers such as Nash, Packard, Studebaker, and the KaiserFrazer Corporation did very well, and the UAW successfully negotiated for pension plans with these
manufacturers in the early 1950s. Id. at 691-93. However, the automobile market declined sharply
in 1953, forcing mergers among these companies that required a large number of workers to lose out
on their pension benefits that had not vested. Id. at 693-94. These losses pushed UAW to obtain
vested pension rights for employees with ten or more years of service after age 29. Id. at 697. The
vested pension plan rights proved of little use as companies such as Packard-Studebaker went out of
business, defaulting on their pension obligations. Id. at 730. For example, when Studebaker finally
closed its plant in South Bend, its pension plan fund was more than $15 million short of meeting its
obligations for the 4,392 employees entitled to receive benefits. Wooten, supra note 31, at 697.
34. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 2(b), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829. Stating:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this Act to protect interstate commerce and the
interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries, by requiring
the disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of financial and other
information with respect thereto, by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility,
and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for
appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.
Id. See also 29 U.S.C.S. § 1001(b) (Lexis 2007).
35. ERISA § 2(c). Stating:
It is hereby further declared to be the policy of this Act to protect interstate commerce,
the Federal taxing power, and the interests of participants in private pension plans and
their beneficiaries by improving the equitable character and the soundness of such plans
by requiring them to vest the accrued benefits of employees with significant periods of
service, to meet minimum standards of funding, and by requiring plan termination
insurance.
Id. See also 29 U.S.C.S. § 1001(c) (Lexis 2007).
36. See generally ERISA. See also Michael B. Snyder, Qualified Dom. Rel. Ord. § 1:4
(2007) (describing how ERISA was enacted and the committees that played a role in negotiating the
passing of the law).
37. Snyder, supra note 36, at § 1:4. Stating:
Prior to the enactment of [ERISA], it apparently was not uncommon for an employee to
be promised a retirement benefit on the condition that he remain employed until he or
she retired.
There was often no letter or document; a handshake was the law of the retirement plan.
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Nothing more than a handshake may have evidenced the agreement to
provide pension benefits.38 ERISA changed the landscape of pension
law, mandating certain reporting procedures,39 record keeping,40 funding
requirements,41 and creating the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(PBGC) to provide protection for pension plan participants against plan
termination.42
ERISA contains four titles.43 Title I deals with the reporting
requirements to which a pension plan administrator must adhere.44 The
pension plan administrator can be a designated person under the plan, a
sponsor, employer, or anyone the Secretary of Labor prescribes as the
administrator if the secretary cannot find a named administrator or
sponsor.45 The administrator must provide an annual report that includes
a financial statement and opinion,46 number of employees in the plan,47
names and addresses of any fiduciary,48 and an actuarial statement.49

There was sufficient anecdotal evidence by the early 1970s of abuses in the private
retirement system to cause a ground swell of congressional interest. Too many
employees, it was said, were being denied the benefits they had been promised.
Congressional action began to move toward the creation of ERISA.
Id.
38. Id.
39. ERISA §§ 101-111. ERISA requires certain disclosures and reporting, including a plan
description (§ 102) and annual reports (§ 103). See also 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 1021-1031 (Lexis 2008).
40. ERISA §§ 107, 209. ERISA requires the plan administrator to keep records for each
employee that shows for what benefits the employee is eligible and what benefits the employee may
become eligible. See also 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 1027, 1059 (Lexis 2008).
41. ERISA § 302. ERISA requires minimum funding standards for covered plans each year.
Id. See also 29 U.S.C.S. § 1082 (Lexis 2008).
42. ERISA §§ 4002-4003. ERISA established the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(PBGC) as a non-profit corporation that has the power to enforce ERISA, investigate pension plans,
and sue for violations of ERISA. Id. See also 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 1302-1303 (Lexis 2008).
43. ERISA § 1. ERISA’s table of contents divides the act into four titles: Title I – Protection
of Employee Benefit Plans, Title II – Amendments to the Internal Revenue Code Relating to
Retirement Plans, Title III – Jurisdiction, Administration, Enforcement; Joint Pension Task Force,
etc., and Title IV – Plan Termination Insurance.
44. ERISA § 1. See also Snyder, supra note 36, at § 1:4. Snyder describes Title I of ERISA
as including provisions “relating to fiduciary standards, reporting and disclosure, and employee
protection and enforcement.” Id.
45. ERISA § 3(16). See also 29 U.S.C.S. § 1002(16) (Lexis 2008).
46. ERISA §§ 103(a)(1)(B)(i), 103(a)(3)(A). Section 103 of ERISA requires that an opinion
by an “independent qualified public accountant” that the financial statements conform to generally
accepted auditing standards and that all information fairly represents information in the context of
the whole financial statement. See also 29 U.S.C.S. § 1023(a)(1)(B)(i) (Lexis 2008).
47. ERISA § 103(c)(1). See also 29 U.S.C.S. § 1023(c)(1) (Lexis 2008).
48. ERISA § 103(c)(2). See also ERISA § 3(21) (defining a fiduciary as someone who
exercises discretionary authority or discretionary control over the management of the plan or its
assets, gives investment advice to the plan for a fee, or has discretionary responsibility or authority
over the administration of the plan). See also 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 1002(21), 1023(c)(2) (Lexis 2008).
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The administrator must also provide a plan description to all participants
and beneficiaries of the plan,50 updated plan descriptions every five
years to those receiving benefits,51 and a written statement of what
benefits have accrued, or will become non-forfeitable, for each
participant of the plan upon request.52 The Secretary of Labor
established the office of Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration
(PWBA) to enforce the disclosure and reporting requirements of
ERISA.53 These reporting requirements are very complicated.54 Title I
also requires minimum funding for pension plans55 and provides for
certain fiduciary responsibilities of pension plan administrators.56
Title II of ERISA deals with the changes made to the Internal
Revenue Code.57 The authority to issue regulations for the funding and

49. ERISA §§ 103(a)(1)(B)(ii), 103(a)(4). An “enrolled actuary” must form an opinion as to
whether the financial statements are “in the aggregate reasonably related to the experience of the
plan and to reasonable expectations; and represent his best estimate of anticipated experience under
the plan.” ERISA §103(a)(4)(B)(i) & (ii). See also ERISA § 103(d) (describing eleven specific
items that must be included in the actuarial statement); ERISA §§ 3041-3043 (establishing the Joint
Board for the Enrollment of Actuaries for the purpose of establishing standards for enrolling
actuaries, and enforcing those standards). An “enrolled actuary” means a “person who is enrolled
by the Joint Board for the Enrollment of Actuaries . . . .” Id. at § 3043; 29 U.S.C.S. §§
1023(a)(1)(B)(ii), (a)(4)(A), (d), 1241-1242 (Lexis 2008); 26 U.S.C.S. § 7701(a)(35) (Lexis 2008).
50. ERISA §§ 104(a)(1)(C), 104(b). See also 29 U.S.C.S. § 1024(b) (Lexis 2008).
51. ERISA § 104(b)(1)(B) (“The administrator shall furnish to each participant, and each
beneficiary receiving benefits under the plan, every fifth year after the plan becomes subject to this
part an updated summary plan description described in section 102 which integrates all plan
amendments made within such five-year period . . .”). See also 29 U.S.C.S. § 1024(b)(1) (Lexis
2008).
52. ERISA § 105(a).
Each administrator of an employee pension benefit plan shall furnish to any plan
participant or beneficiary who so requests in writing, a statement indicating, on the basis
of the latest available information –
(1) the total benefits accrued, and
(2) the nonforfeitable pension benefits, if any, which have accrued, or the earliest date on
which benefits will become nonforfeitable.
Id. See also 29 U.S.C.S. § 1025(a) (Lexis 2008).
53. Snyder, supra note 36, at § 1:4. See also 29 C.F.R. §§ 2520 & 2560 (2008) (detailing the
various reporting requirements that the Secretary of Labor has mandated under Title I of ERISA); 5
C.F.R. § 2641, App. B (2007) (stating that the Employee Benefits Security Administration, formerly
the Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration, became effective on May 16, 1997 under the
Department of Labor).
54. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 2520 & 2560 (2008) (detailing the numerous reporting requirements that
have been developed under ERISA).
55. ERISA §§ 301-306. See also 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 1081-1085(b) (Lexis 2008).
56. ERISA §§ 401-414. The fiduciary responsibilities include providing adequate benefits to
plan participants, minimizing expenses, and diversifying investments. Id. at § 404(a)(1). See also
29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (2000).
57. ERISA §§ 1001-2008. Title II of ERISA is labeled “Amendments To The Internal
Revenue Code Relating To Retirement Plans.” Id. Section 1001 states: “Except as otherwise
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vesting of ERISA plans was originally given to the Department of
Labor, but in 1978, the authority was transferred to the Internal Revenue
Service.58 But the Department of Labor still enforces Title III of
ERISA,59 dealing with jurisdiction and administration.60 Title III also
establishes the Joint Pension Task Force,61 which had the duty of
studying the effect of ERISA on pension plans and reporting to
Congress.62 Title IV deals with plan termination,63 establishes the
PBGC,64 and sets out the types of benefits guaranteed by the PBGC.65
Title IV also contains the procedure for terminating a pension plan66 and
the liability of employers upon plan termination.67
Congress amended ERISA several times during the 1980s.68 One
of the amendments in 198469 was the Retirement Equity Act (REA).70

provided, whenever in this title an amendment or repeal is expressed in terms of an amendment to,
or repeal of, a section or other provision, the reference shall be considered to be made to a section or
other provision of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.” Id. at § 1001. See also 26 U.S.C. §§ 410415 (2000).
58. Snyder, supra note 36, at § 1:4 (“The ERISA Reorganization Plan realigned and clarified
the joint responsibility of qualified and nonqualified plans between the DOL and the Service. By
executive order of President Jimmy Carter, this plan transferred all authority to issue regulations,
rulings, opinions, variances, and waivers pertaining to participation, vesting, and funding from the
Secretary of Labor to the Secretary of the Treasury.”). See also 44 Fed.Reg. 1065 (Jan. 3, 1979)
(mandating that Reorganization Plan No. 4 become effective on December 31, 1978 by executive
order of President Jimmy Carter); Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, 43 Fed.Reg. 47,713 (Oct. 17,
1978).
59. Snyder, supra note 36, at § 1:4 (stating that the DOL still governs issues of jurisdiction,
enforcement, and administration under Title III).
60. ERISA §§3001-3043. Title III of ERISA is labeled “Jurisdiction, Administration,
Enforcement; Joint Pension Task Force, etc.” Id. See also 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 1201-1242 (Lexis 2008).
61. ERISA § 3021. The Joint Pension Task Force was made up of “[t]he staffs of the
Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on Education and Labor of the House of
Representatives, the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, and the Committee on Finance
and the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare of the Senate . . . .” Id. See also 29 U.S.C.S. §
1221 (Lexis 2008).
62. ERISA § 3022. See also 29 U.S.C.S. § 1222 (Lexis 2008).
63. ERISA §§ 4001-4068. Title IV of ERISA is labeled “Plan Termination Insurance” and
includes such subdivisions as Coverage, Termination, and Liability. Id. See also 29 U.S.C. §§
1301-1453 (2000).
64. See supra note 42.
65. ERISA § 4022. The PBGC guarantees all nonforfeitable benefits under a plan’s terms.
Id. See also 29 U.S.C.S. § 1321 (Lexis 2008).
66. ERISA § 4041-4048. A plan may be terminated by a plan administrator under Section
4041 or by a corporation under Section 4042. See also 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 1341-1348 (Lexis 2008).
67. ERISA § 4061-4068. The PBGC has the right to collect payment from employers who are
liable upon termination of a pension plan under Sections 4062 (single employers), 4063 (a
substantial employer of a plan), and 4064 (multiple employers). Id. at § 4067. See also 29 U.S.C.S.
§§ 1361-1368 (Lexis 2008).
68. Snyder, supra note 36, at § 1:5 (listing the amendments to ERISA passed in the 1980s,
such as the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of
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Congress enacted REA in order to remedy ERISA’s anti-alienation
provisions.71 In an attempt to protect a worker’s right to receive his or
her pension, ERISA contained an anti-alienation provision that
prevented courts from dividing pensions upon divorce.72 REA allowed a
divorce court to divide ERISA pension plans upon divorce pursuant to a
QDRO.73 The QDRO is a Domestic Relations Order (DRO)74 that meets
certain specific requirements set out in REA.75 As long as a divorce
1982, the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, the Tax Reform Act of
1986, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, the Pension Protection Act, and the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993).
69. Id. (showing two amendments to ERISA in 1984, the REA and the Deficit Reduction Act
of 1984).
70. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426.
71. Charles T. Caliendo, Jr., Note, Removing the “Natural Distaste” from the Mouth of the
Supreme Court with a Criminal Fraud Amendment to ERISA’s Anti-Alienation Rule, 68 ST. JOHN’S
L. REV. 667, 677 (1994) (stating that the REA amended ERISA so that the anti-alienation provision
would not apply in certain situations by way of QDROs).
72. ERISA § 206(d)(1)-(2). It provides:
(d) (1) Each pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be
assigned or alienated.
(2) For the purposes of paragraph (1) of this subsection, there shall not be taken into
account any voluntary and revocable assignments of not to exceed 10 percent of any
benefit payment, or of any irrevocable assignment or alienation of benefits executed
before the date of enactment of this Act . . . .
Id. See also Caliendo, supra note 71, at 678 (“Prior to the enactment of REA, the courts
were split on whether there was an implied exception to the anti-alienation rule for
family support judgments. Several courts had difficulty creating such an exception
because of the anti-alienation mandate, but also because ERISA preempts ‘any and all
State laws insofar as they may now or hereinafter relate to’ an ERISA pension plan.
Consequently, in addition to the QDRO provision, REA effected a conforming
amendment to ERISA exempting QDROs from ERISA’s state law preemption
provision.”).
73. REA § 104(a)(3)(A). Amending ERISA § 206(d) by adding:
(3)(A) Paragraph (1) shall apply to the creation, assignment, or recognition of a right to
any benefit payable with respect to a participant pursuant to a domestic relations order,
except that paragraph (1) shall not apply if the order is determined to be a qualified
domestic relations order. Each pension plan shall provide for the payment of benefits in
accordance with the applicable requirements of any qualified domestic relations order.
Id.
74. REA § 104(a)(3)(B)(1984). REA defines a domestic relations order as:
(ii) the term ‘domestic relations order’ means any judgment, decree, or order (including
approval of a property settlement agreement) which –
(I) relates to the provision of child support, alimony payments, or marital property rights
to a spouse, former spouse, child, or other dependent of a participant, and
(II) is made pursuant to a State domestic relations law (including a community
property law).
Id.
75. REA § 104(a)(3)(B), (C), (D). REA defines a qualified domestic relations order as:
(B) For purposes of this paragraph –
(i) the term ‘qualified domestic relations order’ means a domestic relations order –
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court issued a DRO that was qualified under REA, an ERISA pension
plan could be divided, and thus the QDRO was born.76
B. Types of Pension Plans Covered by ERISA
ERISA does not apply to all pension plans. ERISA expressly does
not apply to government pension plans,77 church plans,78 plans
maintained for workers’ compensation or unemployment,79 pension
(I) which creates or recognizes the existence of an alternative payee’s right to, or assigns
to an alternative payee the right to, receive all or a portion of the benefits payable with
respect to a participant under a plan, and
(II) with respect to which the requirements of subparagraphs (C) and (D) are met, . . .
***
(C) A domestic relations order meets the requirements of this subparagraph only if such
order clearly specifies –
(i) the name and last known mailing address (if any) of the participant and the name and
mailing address of each alternative payee covered by the order.
(ii) the amount or percentage of the participant’s benefits to be paid by the plan to each
such alternative payee, or the manner in which such amount or percentage is to be
determined,
(iii) the number of payments or period to which such order applies, and
(iv) each plan to which such order applies.
(D) A domestic relations order meets the requirements of this subparagraph only if such
order –
(i) does not require a plan to provide any type of form of benefit, or any option, not
otherwise provided under the plan,
(ii) does not require the plan to provide increased benefits (determined on the basis of
actuarial value), and
(iii) does not require the payment of benefits to an alternative payee which are required
to be paid to another alternate payee under another order previously determined to be a
qualified domestic relations order.
Id.
76. Wright, supra note 6, at 693 (stating that the REA was known as the “QDRO
amendment,” and that a QDRO has to meet the requirements of § 1056(d)(3)(C) in order to assign
part of the participant’s pension plan benefits to another individual).
77. 29 U.S.C.S. § 1003(b)(1) (Lexis 2008). See also GARY A. SHULMAN & DAVID I. KELLEY,
DIVIDING PENSIONS IN DIVORCE § 21.1 (2d ed. 1999). The authors write:
Government pensions such as from the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS), the
Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS), the Military Retirement System, and the
Railroad Retirement Board allow for the equitable division of pension benefits through
independent statutory vehicles that are outside the realm of qualified domestic relations
orders (QDROs). Governmental plans are not ERISA-governed plans and are therefore
exempt from the standard QDRO provisions of the law.
Id.
78. 29 U.S.C.S. § 1003(b)(2) (Lexis 2008). See also VICTOR B. MEYEN & MARK W.
DUNDEE, QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER ANSWER BOOK 13-28 (2d ed. 1998) (stating
that church plans are subject to applicable state and local laws and may be subject to ERISA if the
plan elects to be covered, which may be an attractive option for a church plan that has no specific
rule for dividing pensions on divorce).
79. 29 U.S.C.S. § 1003(b)(3) (Lexis 2008).
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plans maintained outside the United States for the benefit of nonresident
aliens,80 and “excess benefit plans.”81 Even with these exclusions,
however, ERISA governs most pension plans in the United States.82 The
most prominent plans covered by ERISA are the defined benefit and
defined contribution pension plans.83
The defined benefit pension plan was at one point in time the most
popular type of pension plan in America.84 The defined benefit plan is a
pension in which the employer promises to pay the employee a set
amount of money upon retirement.85 The employer could pay the
amount in one lump sum, in monthly payments, or a mixture of both.86
The monthly payments may continue until the death of the employee or

80. 29 U.S.C.S. § 1003(b)(4) (Lexis 2008).
81. 29 U.S.C.S. § 1003(b)(5) (Lexis 2008). See also 29 U.S.C.S. § 1002(36) (Lexis 2008)
(defining an “excess benefit plan” as a plan that provides certain employees benefits that exceed
limits set out in 26 U.S.C.S. § 415); GARY A. SHULMAN & DAVID I. KELLEY, DIVIDING PENSIONS
IN DIVORCE 395 (2d ed. Supp. 2007) (“[T]raditional QDROs do not apply to nonqualified retirement
plans, such as those afforded to CEOs and other company executives”).
82. T.P. Gallanis, Public Policy for Retirement Security in the 21st Century: Reform of
Qualified Retirement Plans: ERISA and the Law of Succession, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 185, 186 (2004)
(“ERISA federalized pension law, establishing federal rules governing the creation, administration,
and termination of most pension plans.”).
83. Jeffrey M. Gorris, Comment, Waivers of ERISA Plan Benefits: Preventing Judicial
Interpretations of a Complex Statute from Frustrating the Statute’s Simple Purpose, 155 U. PA. L.
REV. 717, 719-20 (2007) (“There are two types of ERISA employee benefit plans: ‘employee
welfare benefit plans’ . . . and ‘employee pension benefit plan[s]’ . . . . Pension plans can be
categorized further as either ‘defined contribution plans’ (also called ‘individual account plans’) or
‘defined benefit plans.’”). See also Susan J. Stable, Pension Plan Investments in Employer
Securities: More Is Not Always Better, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 61, 66 (1998) (“ERISA recognizes two
broad categories of pension plans: defined benefit plans and defined contribution plans.”). 29
U.S.C.S. § 1002(34), (35) (Lexis 2008) (defining the “defined contribution plan” and “defined
benefit plan”).
84. Matthew Venhorst, Note & Commentary, Helping Individual Investors Do What They
Know Is Right: The Save More for Retirement Act of 2005, 13 CONN. INS. L.J. 113, 115 (2006/2007)
(stating that the defined benefit pension plan became popular after World War II and peaked in
popularity in the 1970s with as many as sixty-two percent of all workers being covered only by a
defined benefit plan; however, that number dropped to only thirteen percent by 1997).
85. Anenson & Lahey, supra note 7, at 500 (stating that the employer pays a “determinable
benefit” that is usually tied to the employee’s earnings for the employee’s career or “final average”);
Angela Boothe Noel, The Future of Cash Balance Plans: Inherently Illegal or a Viable Pension
Option?, 56 ALA. L. REV. 899, 899-900 (2005) (describing how the formula for determining the
benefits for a defined benefit pension plan can become “backloaded” due to the high salaries earned
by long-time employees in the last three to five years of employment, making the defined benefit
pension plan extremely expensive for employers).
86. Anenson & Lahey, supra note 7, at 500, 502 (describing the benefits paid out under a
defined benefit plan as an annuity for the life of the employee and a cash balance plan as a hybrid
defined benefit plan in which the benefit is typically distributed in one lump sum); Noel, supra note
85, at 901-02 (stating that a cash balance plan is a defined benefit plan in which the employee can
choose to receive a lump sum payment or a stream of payments).
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the death of both the employee and his or her spouse.87 The employer
bears the risk that the employee or the employee’s spouse will live long
enough to consume all the benefits paid into the pension plan.88 ERISA
covers defined benefit pension plans,89 insures them,90 and sets
minimum funding standards for such plans.91
A defined contribution pension plan is a plan in which the
employee and employer make set contributions over the employment
period of the employee.92 Upon retirement, the employee receives the
whole pension plan account and then may cash out the whole account,
receive income from the account, or receive a mixture of both.93 The
defined contribution plan is becoming increasingly popular as employers
try to shift the risk of funding retirement to the employee.94 The

87. Maria O’Brien Hylton, Constance Hiatt, Shannon Minter, & Teresa S. Collett, Same Sex
Marriage and its Implications for Employee Benefits: Proceedings of the 2005 Meeting of the
Association of American Law Schools Sections on Employee Benefits, and Sexual Orientation and
Gender Identity Issues, 9 EMPL. RTS. & EMPLOY. POL’Y J. 499, 503 (2005) (describing how a
defined benefit pension plan must provide survivorship benefits to a spouse of an employee under
ERISA if the employee dies and if the employee dies before he or she retires, the spouse gets the
pension). See also 29 U.S.C.S. § 1055(a), (b)(1)(A) (2008) (mandating that any defined benefit plan
provide a survivor annuity in the form of a “qualified joint and survivor annuity” or a “qualified
preretirement survivor annuity”).
88. Kathleen H. Czarney, Note, The Future of Americans’ Pensions: Revamping Pension Plan
Asset Allocation to Combat the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation’s Deficit, 51 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 153, 166 (2004) (stating that if there are not enough funds invested to pay for the employee’s
retirement benefits under a defined benefit pension plan, the employer has a duty to “make up the
difference”, therefore bearing the risk of investment).
89. Supra note 83.
90. Anenson & Lahey, supra note 7, at 504 (“Pursuant to ERISA, defined benefit pension
plans are insured by the PBGC.”).
91. 29 U.S.C.S. § 1082 (Lexis 2008).
92. Anenson & Lahey, supra note 7, at 501 (describing the defined contribution plan as a plan
in which the employer merely makes a fixed contribution and the employee gets whatever benefit
has accumulated upon retirement, an example being the 401(k) plan); Czarney, supra note 88, at
168 (describing the defined contribution plan as an immediately vesting pension plan that can take
the form of an IRA, 401(k), or a Simplified Employer Pension (SEP)).
93. Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 463-64
(2004) (describing how a defined contribution pension plan is normally paid to the employee in one
lump sum upon retirement and then it is up to the employee to invest the funds or purchase an
annuity contract).
94. Paul J. Donahue, Plan Sponsor Fiduciary Duty for the Selection of Options in ParticipantDirected Defined Contribution Plans and the Choice Between Stable Value and Money Market, 39
AKRON L. REV. 9, 9, 11 (2006) (“During 2002, employees and their employers contributed over $84
billion to defined contribution pension plans (DC Plans), bringing the amount held in such plans on
behalf of many of America’s working people to nearly $2 trillion: a staggering amount that
exceeded by over $200 million the amount held in defined benefit pension plans (DB Plans).”). Dr.
Donahue goes on to write:
[I]n recent years the economic importance of [defined contribution plans] has grown
significantly. At present, nearly 54 percent of total private pension plan assets are held
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employee bears the risk of outliving the available funds in a defined
contribution plan.95 ERISA covers the defined contribution pension
plans of private employers.96
C. Treatment of the Law
The ability to transfer rights from a pension fund under ERISA is
very limited. The United States Supreme Court has ruled several times
that the ability to assign pension plan funds with a QDRO is a limited
exception, not to be expanded to cover any other situations, no matter
how equitable they may be.97 In 1990, the Supreme Court explained its
rationale in one such case, Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat’l Pension
Fund.98
In Sheet Metal, Curtis Guidry embezzled funds from the union for
which he worked.99 While incarcerated, Mr. Guidry attempted to collect
his pension from several pension plans he had through the union from
which he had embezzled funds.100 The pension plans refused to allow
Mr. Guidry to collect his pension, claiming Mr. Guidry forfeited his
right to the pension when he stole from the Union.101 The Union
intervened and claimed the funds should be paid to the Union until the
Union had collected the $275,000 judgment against Mr. Guidry.102 The
trial court ruled that Mr. Guidry did not forfeit the pension plan funds,
but they were to be paid into a constructive trust for the Union until the
Union’s judgment was satisfied.103 The trial court created an equitable

in [defined contribution plans] – and this percentage is likely to increase, because while
$80 billion was contributed to [defined contribution plans] in 2002, only $39 billion was
contributed to [defined benefit plans].
Id. at 11 (footnotes omitted). See also Czarney, supra note 88, at 169. Ms. Czarney writes,
“between 1984 and 1993 alone, defined contribution plans have grown by almost 900 percent. The
contributing factors for this shift in pension plans include the increased government regulation of
defined benefit pensions, increased administrative costs, employment growth in small businesses,
and the greater mobility that defined contribution plans offer.” Id. (footnotes omitted).
95. Noel, supra note 85, at 901 (stating that in a defined contribution plan the employee
decides how the money is invested, is entitled only to the account balance at the time of retirement,
and therefore the employee bears the investment risk); Anenson & Lahey, supra note 7, at 501
(stating that the potential disadvantage to the defined contribution plan is that the employees could
“outlive their retirement resources”).
96. Supra note 83.
97. See infra notes 98-115 and accompanying text.
98. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat’l Pension Fund et al., 493 U.S. 365 (1990).
99. Id. at 367.
100. Id. at 368.
101. Id. at 368-69.
102. Id.
103. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat’l Pension Fund et al., 493 U.S. 365, 369-70 (1990).
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exception to ERISA’s anti-alienation provisions for situations in which
“the viability of a union and the members’ pension plans was damaged
by the knavery of a union official.”104 The Supreme Court struck down
the constructive trust, stating:
Nor do we think it appropriate to approve any generalized equitable
exception—either for employee malfeasance or for criminal
misconduct—to ERISA’s prohibition on the assignment or alienation
of pension benefits. Section 206(d) [29 U.S.C.S. § 1056(d)] reflects a
considered congressional policy choice, a decision to safeguard a
stream of income for pensioners (and their dependents, who may be,
and perhaps usually are, blameless), even if that decision prevents
others from securing relief for the wrongs done them. If exceptions to
this policy are to be made, it is for Congress to undertake that task.105

The Supreme Court interpreted ERISA’s anti-alienation provision
broadly and REA’s QDRO exception narrowly, allowing pensioners to
keep their pension benefits, despite inequitable results.106
In 1997, the Supreme Court further strengthened ERISA in the case
of Boggs v. Boggs.107 Boggs involved a marriage of over thirty years
that ended upon the death of Mrs. Boggs.108 Mr. Boggs remarried, and
then died nine years later.109 The children of the first marriage had a
right to Mr. Boggs’ pension under state law because the first Mrs. Boggs
devised her right in the pension to the children in her will, under
Louisiana’s community property provisions.110 But the second Mrs.
Boggs claimed she had the sole right to the pension under ERISA.111
The Supreme Court ruled that ERISA pre-empted any state law that was
in conflict with ERISA, such as community property laws.112 The Court
104. Id. at 370.
105. Id. at 376.
106. Sharon Reece, The Gilded Gates of Pension Protection: Amending the Anti-Alienation
Provision of ERISA Section 206(d), 80 OR. L. REV. 379, 407-09 (2001) (recounting other court
cases in which a guilty party was not forced to pay his or her victims restitution from a pension
plan, such as the O.J. Simpson case).
107. Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833 (1997).
108. Id. at 836.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 837.
111. Id.
112. Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 854 (1997). See also Tony Vecino, Note, Boggs v. Boggs:
State Community Property and Succession Rights Wallow in ERISA’s Mire, 28 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 571 (1998) (setting out a detailed explanation of the Boggs case and its ramifications). Vecino
writes
[T]he case of Boggs v. Boggs . . . held that [ERISA] preempted Louisiana community
property and succession laws and prohibited the inheritance of a nonemployee spouse’s
community interest in pension plan benefits. Although the Boggs holding involved
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also explained that the QDRO exception to ERISA’s anti-alienation
provision is a narrow exception that courts cannot use to give effect to a
predeceasing non-participant spouse’s testamentary transfer.113 Boggs,
in effect, made ERISA the only means of dividing a pension,114 and the
QDRO one of only two processes by which a pension could be
assigned.115
Ohio courts have not been as restrictive as the United States
Supreme Court. Ohio state courts have attempted to find ways to
expand the power of the QDRO or get around ERISA’s narrow
exceptions to dividing pensions.116 In 1990, the Ohio Supreme Court

preemption of a claim based on community property and succession rights, the Court’s
holding is sufficiently broad to preempt any state laws that conflict with ERISA . . .
Id. at 571 (footnotes omitted); Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, “Meyered” in the Bogg of ERISA
Preemption: Employee Benefits in the Fifth Circuit, 29 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 581, 588 (1998) (“The
[Boggs] Court appears to have abandoned the use of this ‘relates to’ test and has substituted a
conflict preemption test.”); Karen A. Jordan, The Shifting Preemption Paradigm: Conceptual and
Interpretive Issues, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1149, 1165-76 (1998) (discussing the different types of
preemption used by the Supreme Court and the use of a kind of “Implied Preemption” in the Boggs
case).
113. Id. at 848. Justice Kennedy wrote:
It should cause little surprise that Congress chose to protect the community property
interests of separated and divorced spouses and their children, a traditional subject of
domestic relations law, but not to accommodate testamentary transfers of pension plan
benefits. As a general matter, “the whole subject of the domestic relations of husband
and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the
United States. Support obligations, in particular, are “deeply rooted moral
responsibilities” that Congress is unlikely to have intended to intrude upon. In accord
with these principles, Congress ensured that state domestic relations orders, as long as
they meet certain statutory requirements, are not pre-empted.
Id. (citations omitted). Justice Kennedy went on to write, “ERISA’s pension plan anti-alienation
provision is mandatory and contains only two exceptions, see §§ 1056(d)(2), (d)(3)(A), which are
not subject to judicial expansion.” Id. at 851. But see Edward A. Zelinsky, Egelhoff, ERISA
Preemption, and the Conundrum of the ‘Relate to’ Clause, 91 TAX NOTES 1917, 1919-21 (2001)
(describing the Supreme Court’s differing views on ERISA preemption in the last 20 years).
114. William J. Kluwin, Using QDROs to Fund a Divorce: Recent Decisions Illustrate the
Opportunities and the Pitfalls of QDROs, 34 AZ ATTORNEY 26, 37-38 (1997) (arguing that since
Mr. Boggs had cashed out his pension plan and rolled it into an IRA that was not covered by
ERISA, the Supreme Court seemed to allow the ERISA preemption to follow the pension funds
even though the funds were not in a covered pension). See also Erica S. Phillips, Casenote &
Comment, Equality in Life, Inequality in Death: The Ramifications of the United States Supreme
Court Decision in Boggs v. Boggs, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 623 (1998) (giving a detailed explanation of
the Boggs case and criticizing the holding).
115. Phillips, supra note 114, at 641-47 (stating that the Boggs Court limited the ability to
assign a pension to only the provisions expressly provided for by ERISA and REA, which include
the QDRO and the qualified joint and survivor annuity, both of which were created by REA).
116. See infra notes 117-140 and accompanying text.
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heard the case of Hoyt v. Hoyt.117 The parties in Hoyt were married for
eighteen and one-half years and had four children when they divorced in
1988.118 The trial court awarded the wife one-half of the husband’s
General Motors (GM) pension and a survivorship benefit.119 The
pension was vested but unmatured at the time of the divorce.120 The
husband appealed the decision, claiming the court could not grant the
wife a survivorship benefit in the pension,121 and that the trial court
could only divide the present value of the pension, not the potential
future value.122 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s
decision.123 The Ohio Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case
for a re-determination of the wife’s proper share of the GM pension.124
The Ohio Supreme Court held that the wife was entitled to a
survivorship benefit and that the unmatured “Pension Plan A” could be
divided and a share awarded to the wife.125 The importance of the Hoyt
decision was not the reversal or remand of the trial court’s decision, but
the amount of discretion the Ohio Supreme Court gave the trial court in
awarding a QDRO. The Ohio Supreme Court held that a trial court
could take into account any circumstances of the case, status of the
parties, or term of the pension when dividing a pension plan.126 Any
pension earned during the marriage was held to be marital property and
could be used in property division or as alimony.127 Although the court
held that a QDRO providing specific information and instruction to the

117. Hoyt v. Hoyt, 559 N.E.2d 1292, 1294-95 (Ohio 1990).
118. Hoyt v. Hoyt, C.A. No. 4365, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 4685, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988)
rev’d, 559 N.E.2d 1292 (Ohio 1990).
119. Id. at *1-2.
120. Id. at *1.
121. Id. at *5-6.
122. Id. at *2. General Motors offered two types of pension plans, Plan A and Plan B. Hoyt,
1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 4685 at *2. Plan A did not mature until after 30 years of service and the
husband only had 20 years of service at the time of divorce, so the present value of Plan A was $0.
Id. at *2-4. Plan B was a pension in which the employee could contribute to his or her own pension.
Id. at *2. The husband had a total of $439 in the Plan B, and he claimed that this was the only
amount that the trial court could divide and give to his ex-wife. Id. at *2-3.
123. Id. at *9.
124. Hoyt v. Hoyt, 559 N.E.2d 1292, 1300 (Ohio 1990).
125. Id. at 1298-99.
126. Id. at 1295 (“[T]his court holds that when considering a fair and equitable distribution of
pension or retirement benefits in a divorce, the trial court must apply its discretion based upon the
circumstances of the case, the status of the parties, the nature, terms and conditions of the pension or
retirement plan, and the reasonableness of the result . . . .”).
127. Id. at 1294-95.
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plan administrator128 was the only method of dividing the pension under
REA,129 there were alternatives to an REA pension division.130 These
alternatives include “an immediate offset or a current assignment of
proportionate shares, with either a current distribution or a deferred
distribution.”131 Thus, it is the court’s responsibility to value a pension
plan and either draft a QDRO to equitably distribute the asset or
proportionally distribute other assets to compensate for the pension.132
The Ohio Supreme Court used the Hoyt decision not only to expand on
the discretion a trial court could use in drafting a QDRO, but also to
allow for the “equitable division” of a pension by using other marital
assets, bypassing the QDRO altogether.133
Ohio courts expanded their discretion further in the case of Clay v.
Clay.134 In 2007, the Ohio Seventh Appellate District held in Clay that a
divorce decree ordering the husband to pay his ex-wife $9,975 out of his
401(k) plan was a valid order despite the fact that a QDRO was not
prepared.135 Although the court went on to state that a divorce decree is
not a substitute for a QDRO when it comes to a waiver of rights to an
ex-spouse’s pension,136 the court still upheld the division of the
husband’s pension without a QDRO.137 The appellate court claimed the
payment to the wife was a payment from the husband and not the
pension plan administrator, taking it outside of the realm of ERISA.138
The court stated that a QDRO was merely a tool to be used by the
divorce court and that the QDRO could be avoided by using other
128. Id. at 1296 (“The QDRO must be drafted to include very specific information with
explicit instructions to the plan administrator. It is then the responsibility of the plan administrator
to review the order of the trial court and determine whether it constitutes a QDRO . . . .”).
129. Hoyt v. Hoyt, 559 N.E.2d 1292, 1297 (Ohio 1990).
130. Id.
131. Id. The court cautioned, however, “that the trial court cannot violate the terms of the plan
when fashioning a division of the asset.” Id.
132. Id. at 1298-99 (stating that it is the court’s responsibility to value the pension plan, not the
plan administrator’s, and to equitably divide the pension so that both parties receive the most
benefit). See also Straub, supra note 1, at 916 (discussing the equitable distribution method of
property division that Ohio courts use).
133. Id. at 179.
134. Clay v. Clay, No. 06 BE 40, 2007 WL 2582211 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007).
135. Id. at *4 (“The divorce decree specifically ordered Darvin [ex-husband], and not the
pension plan administrator, to make the arrangement for the payment of $9,975 to Linda [ex-wife]
from his 401(k) plan. The record does not indicate a need for a QDRO in this case, since Darvin,
and not the 401(k) plan administrator was ordered to make this payment . . . .”).
136. Id. at *8. The court was referring to an argument made by the husband’s second wife that
the ex-wife waived any right to her ex-husband’s pension when she divorced him, an argument the
appellate court rejected. Id.
137. Id. at *4.
138. Id.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009

21

Akron Law Review, Vol. 42 [2009], Iss. 2, Art. 8

13-DEAN_PUB_EDITS.DOC

4/14/2009 1:31 PM

660

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[42:639

marital assets.139 Apparently, the court viewed the funds obtained by the
husband through the 401(k) plan as “other marital assets” and not part of
a pension plan regulated by ERISA.140 This ruling is in stark contrast to
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Boggs in which Mr. Boggs rolled over his
pension plan into a 401(k) plan that ERISA did not govern, yet the Court
held that ERISA still applied to the 401(k) funds.141
These cases demonstrate the view that a QDRO is an important
aspect of a divorce, although it may not be a necessary one. When it is
determined that the parties need a QDRO, the issue of when an exspouse can appeal the divorce decree becomes relevant.
III. APPEALING A DIVORCE DECREE
A. Appealable Orders
In order for an appellate court to have jurisdiction over an appeal,
the trial court must have issued a final order.142 In Ohio, a final order is
defined by Ohio Revised Code § 2505.02(B).143 If a trial court’s order

139. Clay v. Clay, No. 06 BE 40, 2007 WL 2582211, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (“A domestic
relations court, though, is not required to use a QDRO in a divorce whenever the marital assets
include a pension. The QDRO is a tool available to the trial court to order the administrator of the
pension plan to actually redirect benefits to another payee, if that is necessary as part of the divorce.
The trial court may avoid using a QDRO by designating other marital assets to offset the value of
the pension, or by requiring one party to pay the equivalent value of those benefits or assets to the
other party, rather than by requiring the pension plan administrator to pay an alternate payee . . . .
trial courts have a number of ways to effectuate the division of pension benefits in a divorce other
than using a QDRO . . . .”).
140. Id. at *1. The husband was ordered by the trial court not just to pay his ex-wife $9,975,
but to pay the amount “from his 401(k) retirement fund within 30 days of the divorce.” Id. The
original divorce decree stated, “Darvin is ordered to have his 401(K) make the appropriate payment
to Linda pursuant to this order within 30 days of Judge Sargus’ final Judgment Entry, Decree of
Divorce.” Id.
141. Supra note 114.
142. Wohleber v. Wohleber, No. 06CA009018, 2007 WL 2229284, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App.
2007); Gehm v. Timberline Post & Frame, 861 N.E.2d 519, 522 (Ohio 2007). “Under Section
3(B)(2), Article IV, Ohio Constitution, courts of appeals have jurisdiction only to ‘affirm, modify,
or reverse judgments or final orders of the courts of record inferior to the court of appeals within the
district.’” Id. See also Michael L. Buenger, Ohio Appellate Practice Before and After Polikoff: Are
Things Really All That Much Clearer?, 28 AKRON L. REV. 1, 2-10 (1994) (recounting the unique
history of the “final order” rule in Ohio and impact that has on rights to appeal).
143. Myers v. City of Toledo, 852 N.E.2d 1176, 1178 (Ohio 2006). See also OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2505.02 (2007). It provides:
(B) An order is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or reversed, with
or without retrial, when it is one of the following;
(1) An order that affects a substantial right in an action that in effect
determines the action and prevents a judgment;
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does not fulfill one of the categories set out in § 2505.02(B) the appeal
cannot be heard.144 As the Ohio Ninth District Appellate Court has
stated:
R.C. 2505.02(B)(1) requires that an order affect a substantial right and
determine the action or prevent a judgment. As this Court has
frequently emphasized, the primary function of a final order or
judgment is the termination of the case before the court. This court
must look to the language employed in the purported judgment entry to
ascertain whether the trial court’s entry accomplishes that result. To
terminate a claim between the parties, the order must contain a
statement of relief to which the parties are entitled that is sufficiently
complete so that the parties can enforce their rights and obligations
through an execution on that judgment.
A final statement of relief reserve[s] no further questions or directions
for future determination and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce
by execution what has been determined. A judgment that leaves issues
unresolved and contemplates that further action must be taken is not a
final appealable order. However, when the remaining issue is
mechanical and unlikely to produce a second appeal because only a
ministerial task similar to assessing costs remains, then the order is
final and appealable.145

In Ohio, a final appealable order of divorce must address all issues that
relate to the property division, parental rights, support, and the
responsibilities of the parties.146 Therefore, a divorce decree must not
(2) An order that affects a substantial right made in a special proceeding or
upon a summary application in an action after judgment;
(3) An order that vacates or sets aside a judgment or grants a new trial;
(4) An order that grants or denies a provisional remedy and to which both of
the following apply:
(a) The order in effect determines the action with respect to the
provisional remedy and prevents a judgment in the action in favor of the
appealing party with respect to the provisional remedy.
(b) The appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful or
effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all proceedings,
issues, claims, and parties in the action.
(5) An order that determines that an action may or may not be maintained as a
class action;
***
(7) An order in an appropriation proceeding that may be appealed pursuant to
division (B)(3) of section 163.09 of the Revised Code.
Id.
144. Wenger v. Wenger, No. 05CA0057, 2006 WL 1791171, at*2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006).
145. Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted, emphasis in original).
146. Miller v. Miller, No. 2003-P-0065, 2003 WL 22952573, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).
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only meet the requirements of § 2505.02(B), but also dispose of any
additional claims relating to the divorce, unless there is just cause for
delay.147 For example, a divorce decree that does not provide for an
equitable division of all the marital property is not a final appealable
order, even if the trial court deals with all other issues in the decree.148
Child custody149 and child support150 issues, if applicable to the case,
must be fully determined. But the divorce decree is final and appealable
despite the fact that a trial court retains jurisdiction to modify support151
or the court allows the parties to motion the court for further action.152 A
party has thirty days to appeal a divorce decree once that decree
becomes final and appealable.153
After the time for appeal has passed, a party may receive relief
from a divorce decree by filing a motion for Ohio Civil Rule 60(B)
relief.154 Ohio Civil Rule 60(B)155 allows a party to reopen a closed
147. In re Nichols, No. 03CA41, 2004 WL 868364, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004). See also OHIO
CIV.R. 75(F) (2007) (stating, for purposes of OHIO CIV.R. 54(B), that a domestic relations court
shall not enter a final order for divorce unless: the judgment deals with all matters of property
division, spousal support, and parental rights and responsibilities; or those claims were settled by
previous orders and incorporated into the divorce decree; or the judgment expressly determines that
the court lacks jurisdiction to issue such an order or it is untimely to issue such an order); OHIO
CIV.R. 54(B) (2007) (stating that unless there is a determination that there is a just reason for delay,
any judgment that does not dispose of all claims or rights of all parties is not a final appealable
order).
148. Reed v. Reed, No. 14-03-43, 2004 WL 1488861, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004); Scott v.
Scott, No. 2002-T-0185, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 974, at *6-7 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).
149. Salisbury v. Salisbury, Nos. 2005-P-001 & 2005-P-0084, 2006 WL 1882298, at *8 & n. 1
(Ohio Ct. App. 2006).
150. Atkinson v. Atkinson, 856 N.E.2d 1023, 1025-26 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006).
151. CSEA ex rel. Spencer v. Gatten, No. 89398, 2007 WL 2269693, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App.
2007) (stating that, although the trial court retained jurisdiction for further action, an order was final
and appealable and that, “Ohio courts have long recognized that a court retains continuing
jurisdiction over its orders concerning the custody, care, and support of children”).
152. Ortiz v. Ortiz, No. 05 JE 6, 2006 WL 1851730, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006). The trial
court did not value marital property contained in a storage bin. Id. at *4. The trial court’s order was
determined to be final and appealable despite the non-valuation of marital property because the trial
court always retained jurisdiction to enforce its order and provide for proper distribution of the
items in the storage unit. Id. at *5. The court stated:
A court always retains jurisdiction to enforce its orders. As Appellee points out, this is
normally done through the filing of a contempt of court motion. The divorce decree is
not interlocutory and nonappealable simply because the court “reserved” jurisdiction to
enforce the order, since the authority to enforce this order is inherent in the order itself.
Id. (citations omitted).
153. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2505.07 (2007); OHIO APP. R. 4 (2008); Thompson v. Thompson,
No. 1156, 1975 Ohio App. LEXIS 7194, at *2-3 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975).
154. See e.g. El-Tatawy v. El-Tatawy, No. L-02-1235, 2003 WL 22739938, at *3 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2003); Rainieri v. Rainieri, No. 2004-P-0017, 2005 WL 1713546, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005);
Lambert v. Lambert, No. F-05-002, 2005 WL 3093449, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005); Smith v. Smith,
No. 9-06-41, 2007 WL 730234, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007).
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case, if it meets certain criteria. A court can reopen a case within one
year from the date of judgment if there is newly discovered evidence,
fraud, or mistake.156 A party may motion to have a case reopened under
60(B) more than a year after a court closes the case, if there is a “reason
justifying relief from the judgment”157 and the party makes the motion
within a reasonable time.158 But Rule 60(B) is not a substitute for an
appeal.159 A motion for Rule 60(B) relief is limited to the situations
specifically mentioned and not for general review.160

155. OHIO CIV.R. 60 (2007). It provides:
(B) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud; etc.
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: (1)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(B); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment has been
satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application; or (5) any other reason justifying relief from the judgment. The
motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2) and (3) not more
than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion
under this subdivision (B) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its
operation.
Id.
156. Id. See also Brown v. Brown, No. 07AP-144, 2007 WL 2327072, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App.
2007).
157. OHIO CIV.R. 60(B) (2007); Brown, 2007 WL 2327072 at *1.
158. OHIO CIV.R. 60(B) (2007). See also Hardesty v. Hardesty, Nos. 2004-G-2582 & 2005-G2614, 2006 WL 3059849, at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006). In considering a Rule 60(B) motion with
regards to an undisclosed pension plan, the court stated:
In considering Rule 60(B) motions pertaining to this type of alleged error, courts should
consider the following factors: “what caused the delay in making the motion; whether
the delay was reasonable; what personal knowledge the movant had about the nature,
extent and value of all the marital assets (whether included or omitted); what the movant
should have known about them in the exercise of ordinary care; whether the movant
expressly or implicitly concurred in the property provisions of the separation agreement;
what deceptions, if any, were used by the other spouse; and what has intervened between
the decree and the motion (such as, remarriage of either spouse or both spouses).
Id. (citations omitted).
159. Key v. Mitchell, 689 N.E. 2d 548, 549 (Ohio 1998).
160. Wilson v. Wilson, No. 86817, 2006 WL 2373409 at*1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) (“In order to
prevail on a Civ. R. 60(B) motion, the movant must demonstrate that: 1) she has a meritorious claim
or defense; 2) she is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ. R. 60(B)(1) through
(5); and 3) the motion is made within a reasonable time.” (quoting GTE Automatic Electric, Inc. v.
ARC Industries, 351 N.E.2d 113, 115 -16 (Ohio 1976))). See also Forman v. Forman, No. 9-06-63,
2007 WL 2757630, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (stating that Rule 60(B) can only be used for final
orders and that a party may only file a motion to reconsider for any non-final or interlocutory order).
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B. Ohio’s Split on QDROs
The procedure for appealing a divorce that requires a QDRO is no
different from any other court order.161 The QDRO must be a final order
before the divorce is appealable162 and Ohio Civil Rule 60(B) can only
be used in limited circumstances.163 Before Wilson, however, there was
an issue of when a divorce decree requiring a QDRO became a final
order, thereby allowing the parties to appeal the divorce decree as well
as the QDRO.164 The appellate courts have split165 on whether a divorce
decree could be appealed after the trial court set out the conditions that
the QDRO must meet, but before the QDRO was actually approved by
the pension plan administrator and filed with the divorce decree.
A majority of appellate districts in Ohio followed the rule that the
divorce decree and the QDRO were not final appealable orders until the
pension plan administrator had approved the QDRO, and the court
entered the QDRO as part of the divorce decree.166 The Sixth District
161. Southworth v. Southworth, No. 80704, 2003 WL 23116, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003)
(stating the standards for relief under Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 60(B) in the case of a QDRO).
162. Lamb v. Lamb, No. 11-98-09, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 6007, at *4-5 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998)
(dismissing an appeal from a QDRO because the QDRO was not signed and was not itself a final
appealable order).
163. See, e.g. Hamlin v. Hamlin, No. 1629, 2004 WL 1178754, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004)
(dismissing a ground for appeal of a QDRO because the time to file a Rule 60(B)(1)-(4) motion had
expired, and Rule 60(B)(5) could not be used to open a case after one year if based on a ground that
would have relied on Rule 60(B)(1)-(4) if it had been filed within one year from the close of the
case); Stetler v. Stetler, No. 15-05-16, 2006 WL 1459768, at *1-2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) (ruling that
the passing of sixteen years was too long to file a Rule 60(B) motion to reopen a case in order to
divide an ex-husband’s pension). See also supra note 160.
164. See infra notes 166-173 and accompanying text.
165. See infra notes 166 & 174.
166. Lyddy v. Lyddy, 582 N.E.2d 37, 37-38 (Ohio Ct. App.-6th 1989) (stating that after three
attempts to file a QDRO, the pension plan administrator finally approved the third QDRO and that
the divorce decree issued twenty-one months earlier was most likely not appealable until the QDRO
was filed); Chasko v. Chasko, No. 88949, 2007 WL 2955585, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App.-8th 2007)
(stating in dicta that the court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the QDRO for the
husband’s pension had been entered); Musci v. Musci, No. 23088, 2006 WL 3208558, at *2 (Ohio
Ct. App.-9th 2006); Hyder v. Hyder, No. 06CA0014, 2006 WL 2864115, at *7 & n.1 (Ohio Ct.
App.-9th 2006) (mentioning in a footnote that the court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal because
no QDRO was ordered to be filed, not that a QDRO was missing); Green v. Green, No. 04AP-61,
2005 WL 468234, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App.-10th 2005) (“However, it is well-established that a
judgment apportioning pension benefits between ex-spouses is not a final appealable order until
such time as a qualified domestic relations order (“QDRO”) or DOPO is entered.”); Streza v. Streza,
No. 05CA008644, 2006 WL 709056, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App.-9th 2006) (stating that the court could
hear the appeal only because the trial court had issued a final QDRO); Bucalo v. Bucalo, No.
05CA0011-M, 2005 WL 3193851, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App.-9th 2005) (stating that the original appeal
for the case at bar was dismissed for lack of a filed QDRO, therefore there was no final appealable
order); Vujovic v. Vujovic, No. 04CA0083-M, 2005 WL 1819527, at*1 (Ohio Ct. App.-9th 2005)
(recounting the prior appeal that was dismissed for lack of a final appealable order because a QDRO
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Court of Appeals for Ohio stated that, “a clear majority of Ohio
appellate courts have consistently held that divorce orders are not final
and appealable if a QDRO has been ordered but not prepared.”167 These
courts viewed the QDRO as subject to change up until the time the court
entered the QDRO into the divorce decree.168 Since the QDRO affected
a substantial right169 of the parties and was subject to change,170 the
had not been filed and allowing the current appeal to go forward because the parties had filed a
QDRO); Cooper v. Cooper, No. 84652, 2005 WL 376608, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App.-8th 2005) (“A
judgment apportioning pension benefits between ex-spouses is not a final order until a Qualified
Domestic Relations Order (“QDRO”) is entered that disposes of all the retirement benefits.”); Stare
v. Stare, No. 03-CA-109, 2004 WL 2004152, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App.-5th 2004) (“[T]he decree in the
case sub judice was not a final appealable order, as the parties’ property division was not complete
until the issuance of a COAP/QDRO, as is called for in the decree.”); Batt v. Batt, Nos. 82740 &
83452, 2004 WL 717373, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App.-8th 2004); Keith v. Keith, No. L-04-1011, 2004 WL
541077, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App.-6th 2004); Sabo v. Sabo, No. 03CA008245, 2003 WL 22900633, at
*1 (Ohio Ct. App.-9th 2003) (stating the trial court’s order became final and appealable upon the
journalizing of the QDRO); Rash v. Rash, 799 N.E.2d 226, 228 (Ohio Ct. App.-6th 2003) (reciting
the courts that have held a divorce decree to not be final until a QDRO was entered); Coutcher v.
Coutcher, No. L-02-1054, 2003 WL 397760, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App.-6th 2003); Huffman v. Huffman,
Nos. 00CA704 & 01CA709, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 4919, at *4-5 & n.1 (Ohio Ct. App.-4th 2001)
(stating that QDROs issued eleven months apart were both final appealable orders subject to
appeal); Peters v. Peters, No. 18445, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 672, at *3-4 (Ohio Ct. App.-2d 2001)
(stating that a previous appeal had been dismissed because the court-ordered QDRO had not been
filed); Bohl v. Bohl, No. 98CA007276, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 2289, at *2-3 (Ohio Ct. App.-9th
2000) (declining jurisdiction to hear an appeal because a QDRO had not been filed and therefore no
final appealable order existed); Procuniar v. Procuniar, No. 95-CA-19, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS
3929, at *5-6 (Ohio Ct. App.-2d 1995) (allowing an appeal to go forward because it was filed within
a timely period after the QDRO was filed, although not within a timely period after the divorce
decree was entered); Middendorf v. Middendorf, No. 17-93-17, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 2550, at
*2-3 (Ohio Ct. App.-3d 1994) (dismissing an appeal for lack of final appealable order due to the fact
the trial court did not issue a complete division of marital property, including the issuance of a
QDRO); Scott v. Scott, No. 1-99-79, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 808, at *4-5 (Ohio Ct. App.-3rd 2000)
(“A review of the case law reveals the general consensus that a judgment apportioning pension
benefits between ex-spouses is not a final and appealable order until such time as the QDRO is
entered.”); Kofol v. Kofol, No. 74191, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 2726, at *1-2 (Ohio Ct. App.-8th
1999); Isaacson v. Isaacson, No. WD-01-030, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 750, at *3-5 (Ohio Ct. App.6th 2002) (dismissing an appeal so that the trial court could enter a QDRO).
167. Keith, 2004 WL 651077 at *1.
168. Scott, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 808, at *6 (“We pause to note that until the QDRO is
entered, the trial judge can change his mind about its contents and that of the judgment ordering it.
Additionally, as conceded by Appellant’s counsel at oral argument, until a QDRO is entered and
issued to the plan administrator, there can be no certainty that the plan division will be rejected. In
our view, these considerations strengthen our conclusion that until a QDRO is issued the judgment
entry is not a final and appealable order.”).
169. Id. at *4-5 (“A review of the case law reveals the general consensus that a judgment
apportioning pension benefits between ex-spouses is not a final and appealable order until such time
as the QDRO is entered. The [rationales] underlying this line of cases is that a “substantial right”
has not been affected. In other words, until a QDRO is issued, there is no actual order to the
pension plan administrator directing it to divide the benefits in a certain manner and, therefore, the
spouses are unable to determine, with certainty, exactly how their respective rights will be affected.
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appellate courts would not allow an appeal until the domestic disputes
court finalized the QDRO and made it a part of the divorce decree.171
The fact that a substantial right of the parties was not determined
mandated that the appellate courts lacked jurisdiction to hear an
appeal.172 Any change the trial court made to a QDRO could render an
appellate court decision moot by making property division fair or
rectifying a mistake the appellate court sought to correct. Therefore, the
majority of appellate courts refused to hear an appeal on any aspect of
the divorce decree unless the court-ordered QDRO had pension plan
approval and the court entered it into the decree.173
A minority of Ohio appellate districts held that the divorce decree
was appealable before the pension plan administrator approved the
QDRO and entered it into the record.174 These courts took the position
that the right to appeal should not wait on a disinterested third party to
The bottom line is that there is more to be done in the trial court, that being the issuance of a QDRO
made in compliance with federal law. Consequently, until the QDRO is issued, the judgment of the
trial court cannot be considered final and appealable because it cannot be said to yet affect a
substantial right.”).
170. Keith, 2004 WL 541077, at *1 (finding that the trial court’s divorce decree was not final
because a QDRO was ordered on the condition “if” a pension plan exists, creating the possibility
that not all the marital property was divided); see also Green, 2005 WL 468234, at *2 (“Divorce is a
“special statutory proceeding” and, therefore, all ancillary issues related thereto must be analyzed as
a special proceeding under R.C. 2505.02(B)(2). Therefore, because the division of marital property,
including pension benefits, is clearly an ancillary issue in a divorce proceeding, the judgment of the
trial court is final and appealable so long as it affects a “substantial right.”). The Green court went
on to find that the divorce decree did not affect a substantial right because the QDRO had not been
entered by the court. Id.
171. Cooper, 2005 WL 376608, at *1 (“This court has jurisdiction to ‘review, affirm, modify,
set aside, or reverse judgments or final orders.’ A judgment apportioning pension benefits between
ex-spouses is not a final order until a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (“QDRO”) is entered that
disposes of all the retirement benefits.”). The Cooper court went on to dismiss the appeal because
the court-ordered QDRO was not entered prior to the appeal. Id. at *1.
172. Green v. Green, No. 05AP-484, 2006 WL 1391079, at *1-2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) (“In
Ohio, appellate courts have jurisdiction over final orders from courts within their appellate districts.
However, if an order from a lower court within an appellate district is not final, then an Ohio
appellate court does not have jurisdiction to review the matter, and, as a consequence, the matter
must be dismissed. ‘[B]ecause the division of marital property, including pension benefits, is clearly
an ancillary issue in a divorce proceeding, the judgment of the trial court is final and appealable so
long as it affects a “substantial right.’’’”).
173. See supra notes 166 & 171.
174. Derrit v. Derrit, 836 N.E.2d 39, 43 (Ohio Ct. App.-11th 2005); Wylie v. Wylie, No.
95CA18, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 2341, at *16 & n.1 (Ohio Ct. App.-4th 1996) (Fourth Appellate
District) (affirming the trial court’s distribution of marital assets where the assets included an
ERISA-exempt governmental pension, despite the trial court’s failure to issue a “court order to the
applicable governmental agency directing . . . payment to appellee from appellant’s retirement
benefits”); Wright v. Wright, No. 94CA02, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 5207, at *6-8 (Ohio Ct. App.4th 1994), overruled in part by Liming v. Liming, No. 05CA3, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 2109, at *56 (Ohio Ct. App. 4th 2005).
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approve what the court had ordered.175 The Eleventh Appellate District
stated:
This court has decided to overrule appellant’s motion to dismiss and
hold that the divorce decree is a final appealable order, despite the
absence of a QDRO.
In support of this decision, we feel it impractical to withhold a party’s
right to appeal as they are awaiting the actions of non-parties to divide
retirement benefits and to draft a proper QDRO. It is inherent that the
court, so long as it had directed in its judgment entry and finding of
facts how the pension/retirement assets [sic] are to be divided, may
sign and execute the QDRO. Furthermore, in the event that the
retirement asset cannot be divided consistently with the judgment
entry, the court, pursuant to a properly filed Civ. R. 60(B) motion may
subsequently correct said entry consistent with the plan requirements
or applicable law.176

The Eleventh District adopted a method of allowing appeals without a
QDRO as long as the divorce decree described how the parties were to
draft the QDRO and divide the retirement funds.177 This is important in
matters of divorce when parties need to litigate important issues such as
child custody and spousal support178 while the QDRO could take years
to draft.179 If the subsequently entered QDRO contained an error or was
not the version that the court had ordered, the Eleventh District proposed
the parties use Ohio Rule 60(B) to reopen the case and adjust the QDRO
to comply with the court order.180
The Second and Fourth Appellate Districts have also allowed preQDRO appeals. In Wright v. Wright, the Fourth District allowed an
appeal without a QDRO because the case would otherwise never become
appealable.181 The parties in that case had never filed the court-ordered

175. Derrit, 836 N.E.2d 39 at 43.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Stackhouse v. Stackhouse, No. 15710, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 4853, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App.
1996) (“In divorce proceedings, particularly as such proceedings relate to custody matters, the need
for immediate review sometimes outweighs the harm caused by piecemeal appeals . . .”).
179. See e.g. Lyddy v. Lyddy, 582 N.E.2d 37, 37-38 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (taking twenty-one
months to approve a QDRO). See also supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
180. Derrit, 836 N.E.2d 39 at 43.
181. Wright, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 5207, at *4-9. The trial court had ordered a QDRO, but
the parties had not filed one. Id. at 4. The appellate court acknowledged the fact that other districts
had ruled that “a judgment apportioning pension benefits between ex-spouses was not final and
appealable until such time as the QDRO was entered.” Id. at *5 (citing Lyddy v. Lyddy, 582 N.E.2d
37 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989)). The Wright court relied on the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009

29

Akron Law Review, Vol. 42 [2009], Iss. 2, Art. 8

13-DEAN_PUB_EDITS.DOC

668

4/14/2009 1:31 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[42:639

QDRO.182 The Second District, in Tarbert v. Tarbert, took the position
that a QDRO could not modify a court order, “because the order in
which it was granted has since become final.”183 This view was directly
opposed to the majority view, which saw the QDRO as a method of
adjusting the property division up until the time of entry.184 Although
Tarbert was an appeal from contempt charges,185 the court seemed to
endorse the idea that the court order was final and appealable without a
QDRO.186
The Ohio Supreme Court resolved the split between appellate
districts in the fall of 2007, after the court granted review of Wilson v.
Wilson.187
IV. WILSON V. WILSON
On July 19, 2005, the Wayne County Court of Common Pleas
issued a divorce decree for Douglas and Jennifer Wilson.188 The

ex rel. Papp v. James, 632 N.E.2d 889 (Ohio 1994), in which the court determined that divorce was
a “special statutory proceeding” and that “all ancillary issues related thereto must be analyzed as a
special proceeding under R.C. 2505.02.” Id. at 7. The Wright court determined that the division of
marital property was an ancillary issue in a divorce proceeding and that the trial court’s judgment
was final and appealable as long as it affected a substantial right. Id. The court held that the trial
court’s order determined a substantial right, and that the “judgment entered below is final and
appealable (even in the absence of a QDRO).” Id. at 7-8. Wright was overruled by Liming v.
Liming, No. 05CA3, 2005 WL 1056263, at *5-6 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) which relied on Ohio Civil
Rule 75(F), adopted after Wright had been decided. See also Merit Brief of Appellant at 4-5,
Wilson v. Wilson, 2007 WL 927609 (Ohio 2007) (No. 2006-1814) (hereinafter “Appellant Brief”)
(explaining the circumstances in which Liming overruled Wright). Interestingly, the Second District
in Procuniar v. Procuniar, No. 95-CA-19, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 3929 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995),
relied on the same Ohio Supreme Court Case (Papp) to arrive at an opposite result and denied an
appeal before the court entered a QDRO. Procuniary at *5-6.
182. Wright, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 5207, at *4.
183. Tarbert v. Tarbert, No. 96-CA-0036, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 4328, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App.
1996). The court stated that the QDRO was made “merely in aid of the relief that it granted.” Id.
“Those orders may not vary from, enlarge, or diminish the relief that the court granted, because the
order in which it was granted has since become final.” Id.
184. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
185. Tarbert, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 4328, at *1. Tarbert involved a contempt proceeding in
which the former husband refused to sign a QDRO dividing his pension with his former wife. Id.
The ex-wife’s contempt charges were dismissed by the trial court and the appellate court affirmed.
Id. at 6.
186. Id. at 6 (“At this stage, the court’s power is limited to ordering a QDRO consistent with its
prior order, as an adjunct to and in aid of the relief it granted in that prior order.”).
187. Wilson v. Wilson, 878 N.E.2d 16, 16 (Ohio 2007).
188. Wilson v. Wilson, No. 05CA0078, 2006 WL 2336871, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006), rev’d
by Wilson v. Wilson, 878 N.E.2d 16 (Ohio 2007).
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Wilsons had been married for ten and a half years.189 During the
marriage, Douglas Wilson was a member of the Teamsters Union and
had participated in a pension plan.190 However, Mr. Wilson had only
participated in the pension plan for three years before he was
permanently laid off.191 In order for the Teamsters pension to vest, Mr.
Wilson had to participate in the plan for five years.192 The trial court
divided the unvested193 Teamsters pension plan194 by issuing the
following order:
[Jennifer Wilson] shall receive one-half of the coverture value of
[Douglas Wilson’s] unvested Teamsters pension if and when it
becomes vested. This division shall be through a qualified domestic
relations order (QDRO) prepared and signed at the time of the vesting.
The cost of the preparation of the QDRO shall be equally shared
between the parties.195

Mr. Wilson objected to the Magistrate’s decision, but the court overruled
his objection and entered the Magistrate’s order as the judgment entry on
November 1, 2005.196 Mr. Wilson then appealed the judgment entry,
claiming seven errors committed by the trial court for appellate
review.197 The Ohio Ninth District Court of Appeals, Wayne County,
dismissed the appeal due to lack of jurisdiction on August 14, 2006.198
189. Wilson, 878 N.E.2d at 16 (stating that the Wilsons were married on October 9, 1993 and a
complaint for divorce was filed on July 20, 2004).
190. Appellant Brief, supra note 181, at 1.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Charles F. Basil, District of Columbia Survey: The Divisibility of Pension Interests on
Divorce: The District of Columbia Ups the Ante, 33 CATH. U.L. REV. 1087, 1091 (1984) (“Judicial
decisions determining the divisibility of rights in a pension plan have focused on the level of vesting
of the pension interest in deciding whether to include it in marital property. Accrued pension
benefits fall into one of three broad categories. The interest may be vested and matured, vested but
not matured, or unvested. If the pension interest is vested and matured, an unconditional right to
immediate payment exists. If the interest is vested but not matured, the interest survives discharge
or voluntary termination of the employment relationship before retirement. If, however, the interest
is unvested, it is completely forfeited upon termination of the employment relationship.”).
194. Siler v. Siler, No. CA93-10-081, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 3266, at *2-3 (Ohio Ct. App.
1994) (overruling a prior case and holding that a court may divide an unvested pension as marital
property and retain jurisdiction to distribute the proceeds of the pension if the pension vested). See
also Lemon v. Lemon, 537 N.E.2d 246, 249 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (holding that an unvested pension
is marital property subject to property division upon divorce).
195. Appellant Brief, supra note 181, at 1 (emphasis added).
196. Wilson v. Wilson, No. 05CA0078, 2006 WL 2336871, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006), rev’d
by Wilson v. Wilson, 878 N.E.2d 16 (Ohio 2007).
197. Id.
198. Id. (“This Court has further recognized that this Court lacks jurisdiction to review a
division of marital assets, where the trial court has yet to journalize a Qualified Domestic Relations
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Because the parties had not entered a QDRO, the appellate court denied
Mr. Wilson the right to appeal any of his seven claims.199 Although the
appellate court realized that the parties might never file the QDRO due
to the “speculative” nature of the pension plan vesting,200 the court
nonetheless dismissed the appeal.201 The Ohio Ninth District Court of
Appeals followed the majority view in denying the appeal.202 Mr.
Wilson appealed that decision.
The Ohio Supreme Court granted review on December 27, 2006.203
Both Douglas Wilson204 and Jennifer Wilson205 submitted briefs in
support of allowing an appeal before the parties filed a QDRO.206
Quoting Lamb v. Lamb,207 Mr. Wilson argued that the QDRO is not a
final appealable order, but merely a guide to enforcing the trial court’s

Order (QDRO) ordered by the court to be filed. Only after the QDRO is journalized does the
divorce decree become a final, appealable order. A QDRO has been defined as ‘a current
distribution of the rights in a retirement account that is payable in the future, when the payee
retires.’ Accordingly, if the QDRO has not been filed, the parties’ rights have necessarily not been
fully adjudicated.”).
199. Id. at *2
200. Wilson, 2006 WL 2336871, at *2 (“In this case, no QDRO has been journalized. In fact, it
is merely speculative whether a QDRO may ever be properly journalized, because its filing is
contingent on whether appellant’s Teamsters pension vests at some time in the future.”).
201. Id. at *2 (“By contingently ordering the preparation and signing, and presumably the
filing and journalization, of the QDRO only upon the speculative happening of an uncertain future
event, the trial court has failed to dispose of all issues regarding the division of the parties’ marital
assets . . . . Because no QDRO has been filed, thereby distributing the parties’ current rights in the
pension, and because the judgment entry disposes of fewer than all the issues in the parties’ divorce,
this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Accordingly, this Court dismisses the
appeal for lack of a final, appealable order.”).
202. Id.
203. Wilson v. Wilson, 859 N.E.2d 557 (Ohio 2006) (Table).
204. Appellant Brief, supra note 181, at 2. Mr. Douglas Wilson’s brief, filed on March 2,
2007, contained the following proposition of law: “A DIVORCE DECREE WHICH PROVIDES
FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER IS A FINAL
APPEALABLE ORDER EVEN IF THE QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER HAS
NOT YET ISSUED.” Id.
205. Merit Brief of Appellee at 3, Wilson v. Wilson, 2007 WL 927609 (Ohio 2007) (No. 20061814) (hereinafter “Appellee Brief”). Ms. Jennifer Wilson’s brief, filed on March 20, 2007,
contained the following proposition of law: “A DIVORCE DECREE WHICH PROVIDES FOR
THE ISSUANCE OF A QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER IS A FINAL
APPEALABLE ORDER EVEN IF THE QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER HAS
NOT YET ISSUED.” Id. The brief went on to state, “[t]he Appellee has no direct opposition to the
assignment of error and proposition of law submitted by the Appellant.” Id.
206. Wilson v. Wilson, 878 N.E.2d 16, 17 (Ohio 2007) (“Although the trial court held that the
unvested Teamster’s pension is a marital asset, the court of appeals held that it is speculative
whether a QDRO may ever be properly journalized because its filing is contingent on whether the
pension vests at some time in the future. Both parties disagree with this holding.”) (emphasis
added).
207. Lamb v. Lamb, No. 11-98-09, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 6007 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998).
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decision.208 The QDRO itself does not decide the rights of the parties, it
only “mimics” the order of the court.209 The court, not the QDRO,
determines the substantial rights of the parties.210
Arguing that the divorce decree is final and appealable upon filing
the decree, Mr. Wilson’s brief equates the QDRO to other court-ordered
filings in divorce cases, such as quitclaim deeds and wage withholding
orders.211 A court will order a party to execute a quitclaim deed in a
case where ex-spouses hold joint title to the marital residence.212 Parties
file a quitclaim deed with the county in order to transfer property, but the
divorce is final and appealable before filing the quitclaim deed.213
Courts often use wage garnishment orders for paying child support and
spousal support.214 The parties, however, are able to appeal a divorce
decree before they implement the court-ordered wage garnishment.215
Similar to a QDRO, these filings only execute the court’s order and do
not constitute “a further adjudication on the merits” of the case.216 A
QDRO, like the wage garnishment and quitclaim deed, “is merely a tool
used to facilitate the implementation of the decree of divorce and serves
no purpose other than to distribute to the parties the pension benefits
granted to them in the decree.”217
Mr. Wilson also argued that if the court required the parties to file a
QDRO before appealing the divorce, the court would in effect deny Mr.
Wilson’s appeal “ad infinitum.”218 Due to the speculative nature of Mr.

208. Appellant Brief, supra note 181, at 5.
209. Id. Appellant’s brief quoted the Lamb court:
[T]he QDRO in this case does not affect a substantial right of the parties in that it merely
mimics the order of the original divorce decree. The original divorce decree was the
order which established the parties[‘] property distribution and provided for an equitable
pension division. This is the order which determined the rights of the parties. The
QDRO in this case differs in no way from the divorce decree and is itself a ministerial
tool used by the trial court in order to aid the relief that the court had previously granted.
Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 10-11.
212. Appellant Brief, supra note 181, at 10.
213. Id. at 11 (“There has never been a suggestion that a party must await the filing of the deed
in order to appeal the decree of divorce.”).
214. Id. Once a court orders a wage withholding, the Child Support Enforcement Agency
(CSEA) must notify the employer to begin withholding wages. Id. See also Robert D. Null, Note,
Tenancy By The Entirety as an Asset Shield: An Unjustified Safe Haven For Delinquent Child
Support Obligors, 29 Val. U.L. Rev. 1057, 1071-72 (1995) (giving a short explanation of the
procedures for wage garnishment).
215. Appellant Brief, supra note 181, at 11.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 13.
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Wilson’s pension plan vesting, there was a possibility that Mr. Wilson
would never have the opportunity to file a QDRO.219 In such a case, the
court would deny hearing Mr. Wilson’s seven grounds for appeal, six of
which had nothing to do with his pension.220 Mr. Wilson cited other
cases in which an Ohio appellate court denied an appeal due to the lack
of a properly filed QDRO, thereby delaying the adjudication of other
rights.221
The Ohio Supreme Court held oral arguments on September 11,
2007 and issued an opinion on November 20, 2007.222 In a short
opinion, the court held that “a divorce decree that provides for the
issuance of a QDRO is a final appealable order, even before the QDRO
is issued.”223 Siding with the minority, the court reasoned that the
divorce decree was the final order of the court and that the QDRO was
merely a tool used to enforce the decree.224 The court stated:
A QDRO does not in any way constitute a further adjudication on the
merits of the pension division, as its sole purpose is to implement the
terms of the divorce decree. Therefore, it is the decree of divorce that
constitutes the final determination of the court and determines the
merits of the case. After a domestic relations court issues a divorce
decree, there is nothing further for the court to determine.225

The court ruled that the decree complies with Ohio Civil Rule 75(F)
because the decree sets out how the pension plan administrator will
divide the pension.226 The trial court must determine “the value of the
pension and the percentage to give to each spouse, which may include . .
. expert testimony regarding the value of the unvested pension and the
correct percentage discount for the time remaining until the pension
becomes vested.”227 Because the QDRO cannot alter the divorce decree,
Ohio Civil Rule 75(F) is satisfied upon the filing of the decree.228 The
219. Id.
220. Appellant Brief, supra note 181, at 13.
221. Id. at 15-16 (citing Sabo v. Sabo, 2003 Ohio 6586 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (wife was
delayed from appealing non-pension issues for over a year due to the lack of a properly filed
QDRO), Bucalo v. Bucalo, 2005 Ohio 6319 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (appellant had to wait until a
QDRO was filed in order to appeal five unrelated financial issues), Vujovic v. Vujovic, 2005 Ohio
3942 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (husband appealed the denial of shared parenting, but was denied a
hearing on appeal due to the lack of a filed QDRO)).
222. Wilson v. Wilson, 878 N.E.2d 16, 16 (Ohio 2007).
223. Id. at 19.
224. Id. (citing Lamb, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 6007, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998)).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Wilson, 878 N.E.2d at 18.
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court also stated that if the decree was not appealable, the parties might
never be able to bring an appeal due to the unvested nature of Mr.
Wilson’s pension.229
V. RAMIFICATIONS OF WILSON V. WILSON
By allowing parties to appeal their substantive claims before they
file a QDRO, the Ohio Supreme Court has removed a significant delay
to appealing divorce cases. QDROs can take months to prepare.230
During that time, parties may be neglecting the rights of ex-spouses and
children.231 Much needed support may be awaiting appeal. By allowing
a timely appeal, the Wilson decision brings Ohio in line with other states
that have decided this issue.232
Forcing the parties to sacrifice other rights to the divorce decree in
order to preserve the right to a pension is inequitable. If the parties to a
divorce decree must wait for a pension plan administrator to draft a
QDRO in order to appeal other rights, the courts would force the parties
into a situation in which they must choose between valuable rights. On
the one hand, the parties can choose to preserve their right to the other’s
pension, wait for the filing of the QDRO, and let their rights to child
support, spousal support, or child custody deteriorate. On the other
hand, if the parties wish to pursue their claim for child support or child
custody on appeal, they may have to agree to forfeit their right to their
ex-spouse’s pension by giving up any interest in a QDRO in order to
pursue an appeal.233 This type of situation creates bargaining power that

229. Id. See also Wilson v. Wilson, No. 05CA0078, 2008 WL 2580931 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008).
Upon remand, the court sustained one of Mr. Wilson’s seven assignments of error. Id. at *6.
230. Gendreau v. Gendreau (In re Gendreau), 122 F.3d 815, 819 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that
drafting a QDRO is “a process which everyone (including Congress) recognizes as timeconsuming”). See also 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(H) (2000) (providing an eighteen month time period
to determine if a DRO is a QDRO).
231. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
232. See e.g. Holland v. Holland, Record No. 1231-04-3, 2004 WL 2790653, *1 n.1 (Va. App.
2004) (Virginia); Incontro v. Incontro, No. A-01-1068, 2003 WL 1962884, at *1 (Neb. App. 2004)
(Nebraska); Prol v. Prol, 935 A.2d 547, 550 (Pa.Super. 2007) (allowing an appeal before the wife
filed a QDRO); In re Marriage of Davis, 120 Cal.App.4th 1007, 1013-14 (Cal.App. 2d 2004)
(addressing an appeal prior to the filing of a QDRO); In re Marriage of Ward, 641 N.E.2d 879 (Ill.
Ct. App. 1994) (allowing multiple appeals from a divorce, some of which occurred before a QDRO
was filed). But see also Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 566 A.2d 767,773-74 (Md. Ct. App. 1989) (stating
that the trial court’s order was not final until the QDRO was denied).
233. Goulding v. Goulding, No. 2007-T-0011, 2007 WL 4484781, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007)
(parties can agree to the conditions of the QDRO which becomes like a legally binding contract that
will be carried out on its terms); Unger v. Unger, No. 2003CA00356, 2004 WL 2496435, at *3
(Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (Boggins, J., dissenting). “[C]ourts and orders therefrom are not for the
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favors the spouse with the pension that can be used to force the other
spouse to not bring a valid claim. At the extreme, this situation
mandates that the court forever bar an appeal when the parties might
never draft a QDRO, as was the case in Wilson.
But there is also a negative aspect to allowing a pre-QDRO appeal.
The pension plan administrator must approve the QDRO before the court
can file it with the divorce decree.234 If the pension plan administrator
does not approve the court’s determination of the pension division after
the divorce decree becomes final, the court may have to adjust the
parties’ property division in order to accommodate a proper QDRO.
Because the court cannot modify its own property division once it is
final,235 the losing party may have limited avenues for redress if the prior
court order is final.236 Another issue arises when the parties agree on a
QDRO during divorce proceedings. The QDRO filed with the court may
not be what the parties agreed to.237 If the parties file a QDRO more
than thirty days after the divorce decree, the decree is no longer
appealable.238 The parties could be stuck with a QDRO that unfairly
favors one spouse.

benefit of themselves . . . judicial orders are not sacrosanct and . . . parties may agree to other
arrangements.” Id.
234. See supra note 13. See also Albert Feuer, Who is Entitled to Survivor Benefits From
ERISA Plans?, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 919, 1000 (2007) (describing the pension plan
administrator’s obligation to sequester payments subject to a DRO for eighteen months while the
DRO becomes a QDRO and that the QDRO may be modified due to suggestions by the pension
plan administrator).
235. McGee v. McGee, 860 N.E.2d 1054, 1057 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) (stating that a court may
not modify its own property division, yet the parties to the litigation are free to modify the court
order themselves).
236. See e.g. Miller v. Miller, No. 07CA0068-M, 2008 WL 1930784, at *1-2 (Ohio Ct. App.
2008) (applying Wilson retroactively to deny an appeal); Rothman v. Rothman, No. 07CA009295,
2008 WL 4116089, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008) (applying the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in
Wilson retroactively in order to deny an appeal from a divorce as untimely because the husband
filed the appeal five months after the trial court entered its judgment, yet only six days after the
parties filed a QDRO); Poleondakis v. Poleondakis, No.23981, 2008 WL 2267188 (Ohio Ct. App.
2008); Zorn v. Zorn, No. 07CA0077-M, 2008 WL 2079431 (Ct. App. 2008). In this case, the Ohio
Ninth District Court of Appeals denied the wife’s appeal both before and after the Wilson decision,
the first time for lack of a final appealable order and the second time for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at
*3 & n.1.
237. Hale v. Hale, No. 21402, 2007 WL 625813, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007). An independent
court-appointed pension evaluator drafted a QDRO for the divorcing couple. Id. at *1. The exhusband attempted to vacate the QDRO because the parties had not agreed to some of the terms of
the QDRO and some of the terms were never shown to the ex-husband. Id. at *2.
238. A limited number of cases have allowed separate appeals from both the divorce decree
and the QDRO. See Pierron v. Pierron, No. 07CA3153, 2008 WL 746948, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App.
2008); Wigel v. Wigel, Nos. 06CA7- & 07CA10, 2008 WL 495896, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008).
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Courts may also interpret the Wilson decision to eliminate the
appeal rights of many divorcing couples. Recently, courts have
retroactively applied the Wilson decision, denying jurisdiction over
appeals from divorce decrees that trial courts entered before the Wilson
decision and months before the parties filed an appeal, but in which the
parties were waiting for a QDRO.239 In Rothman v. Rothman, the Ohio
Ninth District Court of Appeals used the Wilson decision to deny
jurisdiction for an appeal filed before Wilson was decided.240 The court
denied the parties in Rothman the right to appeal because they relied on
case law and waited to appeal until they filed a QDRO.
The timing of appeal for divorce cases and the subsequently filed
QDRO may also have an effect on bankruptcy law. Many divorcing
couples go through bankruptcy prior to, or subsequent to, divorce.241
The rights to pension benefits in the near future may have an impact on
the bankruptcy proceedings,242 although Ohio exempts certain pensions
and IRAs from garnishment or attachment in bankruptcy.243 If a court
files a QDRO that incorrectly gives a large portion of pension income to
one spouse, that spouse may become prejudiced in a bankruptcy
proceeding.244 The spouse must have a way of correcting a QDRO that
239. See supra note 236.
240. Rothman, 2008 WL 4116089, at *1 (“Although Husband filed his notice of appeal one day
before the Supreme Court issued its decision in Wilson, this Court has determined that the ruling in
Wilson is applicable both prospectively, and retroactively . . . . Therefore, Wilson is the controlling
authority in the case at hand.”).
241. Jonathan D. Fisher & Angela C. Lyons, Till Debt do us Part: A Model of Divorce and
Personal Bankruptcy, 4 REV. ECON. HOUSEHOLD 35, 36, 44-45 (2006) (finding that “being recently
divorced doubles the probability of bankruptcy” and “that filing for bankruptcy almost doubles the
likelihood of divorce.”). The authors state:
Research shows that bankruptcy and divorce are positively correlated, such that the
unconditional probability of bankruptcy is high after a household becomes divorced. . . .
There are reasons why divorce may be a likely contributor to bankruptcy: (1) divorce
imposes high costs on the family (e.g., lawyer fees) causing bankruptcy to become a
financially viable option or (2) lawyers cross-market products during their counseling
(i.e., inform the participants of the divorce about the benefits of bankruptcy). However,
it may just be the case that the factors that drive the bankruptcy decision are the same
factors that drive the divorce decision.
Id. at 36.
242. See, e.g. C. Scott Pryor, Rock, Scissors, Paper: ERISA, the Bankruptcy Code and State
Exemption Laws for Individual Retirement Accounts, 77 AM. BANKR. L.J. 65 (2003) (discussing the
interaction between ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code exemptions); Alyson F. Finkelstein, Note &
Comment, A Tug of War: State Divorce Courts versus Federal Bankruptcy Courts Regarding Debts
Resulting from Divorce, 18 BANK. DEV. J. 169 (2001); Ottilie Bello, Comment, Bankruptcy and
Divorce: The Courts Send a Message to Congress, 13 PACE L. REV. 643 (1993).
243. OHIO REV. CODE § 2329.66(A)(10) (2007).
244. 11 U.S.C.S. § 707(b) (Lexis 2008) (providing certain debt to income ratio limits to filing a
Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition).
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the court files more than thirty days after the divorce decree becomes
final.
The courts can easily solve most of these issues by allowing parties
to re-open their divorce under Ohio Civil Rule 60(B) solely for the
purposes of adjusting the QDRO.245 Under Ohio Civil Rule 60(B)(5), a
party to the divorce may motion the court to reopen the case for any
reason that justifies relief.246 An erroneously entered QDRO would
certainly qualify as a reason justifying relief.247 The QDRO may have a
large detrimental effect on the financial stability of one or both spouses
if it is incorrect. Additionally, the inaccurate QDRO would not be
subject to the one-year limitation of Ohio Civil Rule 60(B)248 because it
is not mistake,249 inadvertence,250 surprise,251 excusable neglect,252

245. See Derrit v. Derrit, 836 N.E.2d 39, 43 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (“Furthermore, in the event
that the retirement assets cannot be divided consistently with the judgment entry, the court, pursuant
to a properly filed Civ. R. 60(B) motion may subsequently correct the entry consistent with the plan
requirements or applicable law.”). See also Kingery v. Kingery, No. 8-05-02, 2005 WL 1662022, at
*1-2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (upholding a Rule 60(B) motion to modify a QDRO seven months after a
final divorce); Borzy v. Borzy, No. 3185-M, 2001 WL 1545676, at *3-4 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001)
(upholding trial court’s decision to grant appellant’s 60(B)(5) motion).
246. OHIO CIV.R. 60(B)(5) (2007) (allowing relief from a judgment or order by any reason
justifying relief). See also supra note 155.
247. Wilson v. Lee, 876 N.E.2d 1312, 1315 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (describing Ohio Civil Rule
60(B) as, “a ‘remedial rule to be liberally construed so that the ends of justice may be served’”).
248. OHIO CIV.R. 60(B) (stating that there is a one year limitation only applies for re-opening a
case on the grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, newly discovered
evidence, or fraud). See also supra note 155.
249. Smith v. Smith, No. 83275, 2004 WL 2361973, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004). The court set
forth the standard for Ohio Civil Rule 60(B)(1) relief in a divorce case:
Typically, courts will grant relief on the basis of mistake when the mistake is a mutual
mistake shared by both parties as to a material fact in the case. However, ‘the courts of
this state have generally held that relief from [a divorce] decree will not be granted when
the alleged ‘mistake’ was merely a unilateral mistake on the part of one party or her
counsel.’ In such situations, the party alleging the mistake ‘must show why he was
justified in failing to avoid mistake or inadvertence; gross carelessness is insufficient.’
Id. (citations omitted). An inaccurate QDRO is not a mutual mistake shared by both parties at the
time the parties agreed upon the terms of the QDRO. Rather, the incorrect QDRO is simply a
wrongly drafted document filed post judgment.
250. Wilson, 876 N.E.2d at 1317. The court quotes Black’s Law Dictionary to define
‘inadvertence’ for the purposes of Ohio Civil Rule 60(B) as “[h]eedlessness; lack of attention; want
of care; carelessness; failure of a person to pay careful and prudent attention to * * * a proceeding
in court by which its rights may be affected.” Id. (emphasis in original). Drafting a QDRO that is
not in conformity with the divorce decree is not due to “lack of attention” or “want of care,” but
rather, post-decree mistake or drafting error.
251. OHIO CIV.R. 60(B)(1) (2007).
252. Heard v. Dubose, No. C-060265, 2007 WL 424094, at **3 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007). The
court summarized the ‘excusable neglect’ standard of Ohio Civil Rule 60(B) as:
[c]ourts have defined excusable neglect in the negative, stating that a defendant’s
inaction is not excusable neglect when it shows ‘a complete disregard for the judicial

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol42/iss2/8

38

Dean: Wilson v. Wilson

13-DEAN_PUB_EDITS.DOC

2009]

4/14/2009 1:31 PM

WILSON V. WILSON

677

fraud,253 or newly discovered evidence.254 Nevertheless, the parties
would have to file the Rule 60(B) motion within a reasonable time from
the time the court files the QDRO.255 By allowing the parties to appeal
their divorce decree before filing a QDRO and then allowing them to use
Ohio Civil Rule 60(B) to correct any mistakes in the QDRO, the courts
would protect the parties’ rights in the QDRO as well as allow timely
appeal of other ancillary issues to the divorce.
The Wilson case correctly allows for a timely appeal from a divorce
decree, however, it does not address the need for corrective action if the
QDRO is incorrect.256 Although the QDRO must conform to the
mandates of a divorce decree,257 parties can differ on the proper
interpretation. Parties need a procedure for litigating the accuracy of a
QDRO entered by the court after the divorce decree is final and the
period for appeal has ended. Using Ohio Civil Rule 60(B) is the only
method of providing that procedure. The courts, however, should limit
the issues to modifying the QDRO to conform to the divorce decree.
Any other issues of the divorce are properly handled on appeal.

system’ or it falls substantially below that which is reasonable under the circumstances.
A determination of excusable neglect depends on the facts and circumstances of each
case.
Id. An incorrect QDRO is not necessarily a result of neglect. The QDRO could be incorrect for a
number of reasons, including an error by the plan administrator.
253. Leibold v. Hiddens, No. 21587, 2007 WL 1721347, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (“A claim
of actual fraud is established by showing a false misrepresentation of fact that is material to the
transaction made with intent to mislead, and which did, in fact, result in justifiable reliance and
injury.”).
254. Dunham v. Dunham, 870 N.E.2d 168, 188 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007). The court explains that
in terms of Ohio Civil Rule 60(B), “[n]ewly discovered evidence refers to evidence in existence at
the time of trial of which the aggrieved party is excusably ignorant.” Id. A subsequently filed
QDRO is obviously not in existence at the time of a divorce proceeding.
255. GTE Automatic Electric, Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc., 351 N.E.2d 113, 116 (Ohio 1976).
The Ohio Supreme Court described the standards for bringing a successful Ohio Civil Rule 60(B)
motion as:
To prevail on his motion under Civ. R. 60(B), the movant must demonstrate that: (1) the
party has a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is granted; (2) the party is
entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ. R. 60(B)(1) through (5); and (3)
the motion is made within a reasonable time, and, where the grounds of relief are Civ. R.
60(B)(1), (2), or (3), not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was
entered or taken.
Id. (emphasis added). See also supra note 160.
256. See generally Wilson v. Wilson, 878 N.E.2d 16 (Ohio 2007).
257. Lamb v. Lamb, No. 11-98-09, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 6007, at *5-6 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998)
(“Indeed a QDRO may not vary from, enlarge, or diminish the relief that the court granted in the
divorce decree, since that order which provided for the QDRO has since become final.”).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Divorces are on the rise in America258 and spouses must find ways
to disentangle themselves and make a clean break.259 The Ohio Supreme
Court’s decision in Wilson v. Wilson correctly resolved an important
issue in Ohio divorce law, thereby facilitating the divorce process.
Allowing a party to appeal the divorce decree before the parties finalize
a QDRO is important in preserving the rights of both spouses. One
spouse can no longer use the long delay of drafting a QDRO to pressure
the other spouse into giving up rights or child custody. The QDRO
drafting process does not have to be rushed to the detriment of the
parties in order to appeal an issue that one ex-spouse views as more
important than the pension plan benefits. Parties may now freely resolve
their disputes without waiting for a disinterested pension plan
administrator to draft an unrelated document.
The issue of appealing a QDRO, however, is not yet resolved. If
the divorce is final and the court enters the QDRO months or years later,
how do the parties address problems with the QDRO? The easiest
solution is for the parties to file an Ohio Civil Rule 60(B) motion to
reopen the divorce case. The court can simply limit the motion to
address the issues of the QDRO, allowing the parties to deal with the
other issues by appealing the decree. The result would give the parties
thirty days to appeal the divorce and the ability to contest the QDRO
within a reasonable amount of time after the pension plan administrator

258. Amy C. Henderson, Comment, Meaningful Access to the Courts?: Assessing SelfRepresented Litigants’ Ability to Obtain a Fair, Inexpensive Divorce in Missouri’s Court System, 72
UMKC L. REV. 571, 572-73 (2003) (“The rate of divorce in the United States has increased
phenomenally during the last decade. With the number of divorces quadrupling in less then twentyseven years, ‘the United States has the highest divorce rate of any [industrialized] nation in the
world.’ In 1970, an estimated 4.3 million Americans were divorced. By 1996, that number had
soared to 18.3 million. Additionally, ‘the divorce rate in 1999 was half the rate for marriages in the
same year.’”).
259. Straub, supra note 1, at 916. Straub explains how Ohio courts approach a divorce case,
specifically through property division:
The general view is that marriage is an economic partnership in which both spouses
contribute, and in such a circumstance, a court will divide marital property equitably
regardless of each person’s independent monetary or material earnings during the
marriage. For example, Ohio courts approach property division through an equitable
distribution viewpoint, and in doing so, strive to fairly and reasonably divide property
between the divorcing parties. In making an equitable distribution of property, Ohio
courts divide all marital property equally, and then appropriately adjust the division
under the specific facts of each case. In sum, divorce courts attempt to end the marriage
and fairly separate all the assets in order for the parties to live with as few ties to each
other as possible.
Id.
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files it. Without this option, the parties are subject to being stuck with a
poorly drafted QDRO that unfairly favors one spouse.
The courts should also strive to find an equitable solution to those
appeals that relied on pre-Wilson case law and waited for a QDRO filing
before appealing. Courts should not preclude parties from appealing
when they were merely following the rule of law. An equitable solution
may be to allow the parties to appeal once a QDRO is filed or allow an
appeal within thirty days of the Wilson decision. For the courts that deal
with this issue, however, denying an appeal due to justifiable reliance on
case law is not a fair adjudication of the parties’ rights to appeal.
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